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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is trite law that when it comes to the rights and freedoms expressed 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 there is no hierarchy 
of rights. As Lamer C.J.C. noted in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp.: “A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, 
must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when 
developing the common law. When the protected rights of two 
individuals come into conflict ... Charter principles require a balance to 
be achieved that fully respects the importance of both sets of rights.”2 
This principle has been repeated so often that it has become something of 
a creedal statement, in which all and sundry profess a willingness to treat 
each and every Charter right with exquisite equanimity. Indeed, the “no 
hierarchy of rights” doctrine requires its adherents to regard any 
suggestion that certain rights might be more equal than others as 
anathema. 
This article challenges the received wisdom and advances the almost 
heretical view that, in recent years, Canadian jurisprudence has revealed 
an increasing tendency toward the creation of a hierarchy of rights. 
Moreover, it suggests that we have arrived at an era in which the “no 
hierarchy” doctrine will be tested in a variety of ways, but most 
especially in the context of religious and equality rights. In the religion 
context, Canada’s diverse religious landscape will continue to provide an 
ever-growing range of challenges from minority religious practices 
seeking accommodation in the public sphere. In addition, the interplay  
 
                                                                                                                       
* Professor of Law and Director of the Common Law Programme, Université de Montréal. 
B.Th. (McGill), J.D. (Boston), S.J.D. (Pennsylvania). 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 878 (S.C.C.). See also Trinity Western 
University v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, [2015] N.S.J. No. 32, 2015 NSSC 25, at para. 187 
(N.S.S.C.). 
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between religious and equality rights has become a new battleground as 
adherents of both majority and minority religions resist engagement with 
same-sex marriage and transgender rights. 
II. HIERARCHIES OF RIGHTS IN THE  
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME 
At the outset, it is important to note that, despite repeated assertions to 
the contrary, there are, in fact, several hierarchies of rights in the 
Canadian constitutional scheme. The first is a structural hierarchy that is 
contained within the provisions of the Constitution Acts themselves. The 
second is a structural hierarchy within the Charter created by section 33’s 
Notwithstanding Clause. The third is a hierarchy existing within the 
“common rights” of the Charter, the lines of which have been sketched 
out in more complete detail by both the judiciary and various human 
rights tribunals over the past decade. It is this third hierarchy that is the 
primary concern of this article, but it is helpful to first briefly consider 
the first two hierarchies. 
1. The Constitution’s Structural Hierarchy 
The various Constitution Acts contain a hierarchy of competing rights 
within their very structure. This structural hierarchy came about as a 
result of the series of compromises along linguistic and religious lines 
that were thought necessary to bring about Confederation. Other parts of 
the hierarchy appear to be the result of political considerations resulting 
from changes in views of the status of Aboriginal peoples or the 
relationship between the sexes. Thus, the educational rights of religious 
minorities contained in section 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867,3 as 
well as the Aboriginal rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution  
 
                                                                                                                       
3 See Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J.  
No. 44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, at para. 60 (S.C.C.) (holding that the Charter cannot be used to 
invalidate the denominational schools created existing under s. 93(1) on the grounds that “[t]he 
Charter cannot be applied so as to abrogate or derogate from rights or privileges guaranteed by or under 
the Constitution” (at para. 61)). Section 93 “maintains or ‘freezes’ the immediate pre-confederation 
situation in relation to denominational school rights. A primary practical effect of s. 93(1) in the 
contemporary context is that it ensures funding for Protestant or Catholic schools in certain 
provincial contexts”: Mark Carter, “An Analysis of the ‘No Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights 
Doctrine’” (2006) 12 Rev. Const. Stud. 19, at 23. 
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Act, 1982, cannot be limited through the use of section 1 or section 33 of 
the Charter.4 The privileged status of section 93’s education rights was 
made necessary by the need to obtain consensus for what Wilson J. has 
called “a fundamental part of the Confederation compromise”,5 whilst a 
rethinking of the political situation of the place of the First Nations in the 
constitutional scheme provided the impetus for section 35.6  
As a result, the denominational schools provisions of section 93 are 
immune from challenge under section 2(a) (freedom of religion) or 
section 15(1) (equality) of the Charter.7 For their part, pre-existing 
Aboriginal rights, while not subject to limitation under the Charter, are 
subject to limitation by Parliament. However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has made clear that federal legislation affecting Aboriginal rights 
is subject to strict scrutiny, and the Crown will be held to “a high standard 
of honourable dealing” consistent with the fact that the “relationship  
 
                                                                                                                       
4 The reason for this is that s. 35, guaranteeing Aboriginal rights, is outside the Charter and 
thus not subject to s. 1 or 33 of the Charter. However, as Peter Hogg notes, this exclusion may not be 
entirely beneficial because enshrining Aboriginal rights outside the Charter prevents First Nations 
peoples from obtaining remedies under s. 24: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 36.8(e).  
5 Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, 
at para. 63, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.). See also Reference re Ontario Bill 30, [1986] O.J.  
No. 2355, 53 O.R. (2d) 513, at 575-76 (Ont. C.A.): 
These educational rights, granted specifically to the Protestants in Quebec and the Roman 
Catholics in Ontario, make it impossible to treat all Canadians equally. The country was 
founded upon the recognition of special or unequal educational rights for specific 
religious groups in Ontario and Quebec. The incorporation of the Charter into the 
Constitution Act, 1982, does not change the original Confederation bargain. A specific 
constitutional amendment would be required to accomplish that. 
6 This seems to have been especially the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder 
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Calder”], which held that Aboriginal peoples’ historic occupation of the land gave rise 
to legal rights that survived European settlement, thus recognizing the possibility of present-day 
Aboriginal rights to land and resources. Calder was to become an important factor in prompting the 
federal government to develop policies for addressing unsettled Aboriginal land claims. See Senate 
of Canada, Final Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Taking Section 35 Rights Seriously: Non-derogation Clauses Relating to Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada, 2007). See also R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1105 (S.C.C.): 
[Section 35(1)] represents the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the 
political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights. The 
strong representations of native associations and other groups concerned with the welfare 
of Canada’s aboriginal peoples made the adoption of s. 35(1) possible .... Section 35(1), 
at the least, provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can 
take place. It also affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial 
legislative power. 
7 Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). 
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between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than 
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal 
rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship”.8 
2. Section 33’s Charter Hierarchy 
It is also clear that the Charter has its own hierarchy of rights based 
on the applicability of section 33’s override provision. Thus, fundamental 
freedoms (religion, expression, association), legal rights (due process and 
privacy) and equality rights are subject to override by both Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures through the use of the Notwithstanding 
Clause.9 At the same time, however, democratic rights (sections 3-5), 
mobility rights (section 6), minority language rights (sections 16-23) and 
the right to equality between the sexes (section 28) are not. The result is 
that section 33 “creates two tiers of rights: the ‘common rights’ that are 
subject to override, and the ‘privileged rights’ that are not”.10  
Moreover, within the category of “privileged rights” there appears to 
be no question that language rights are paramount. Like minority 
education rights, linguistic protections in the Charter are a function of 
“our peculiar Canadian heritage and the evolution of our social and political 
history”.11 Consequently, as Wilson J. noted in Société des Acadiens, 
“double entrenchment of language rights in the Charter and the 
commitment to linguistic duality in s. 16 would seem to support the view ... 
that in terms of importance linguistic rights now stand ‘at the highest level 
                                                                                                                       
8 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1108-1109 (S.C.C.). This is 
not to say that Aboriginal rights may never be abridged. On the contrary, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that s. 35 rights may be limited by Parliament provided there has been a proportionality 
analysis akin to that envisioned by s. 1 of the Charter. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 44, , [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, at para. 13 (S.C.C.): 
[L]egislation can infringe rights protected by s. 35 only if it passes a two-step 
justification analysis: the legislation must further a “compelling and substantial purpose” 
and account for the “priority” of the infringed Aboriginal interest under the fiduciary 
obligation imposed on the Crown …. 
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
10 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 
36.8(e). Professor Hogg also suggests that s. 28 is at the top of the hierarchy as the use of the phrase 
“Notwithstanding anything in this Charter” might also imply that s. 28 cannot be overridden by 
legislation under s. 1. Id., at 55.17(c).  
11 Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in 
Education, Grand Falls District 50 Branch, [1986] S.C.J. No. 26, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, at para. 186 
(S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
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of the constitutional hierarchy’”.12 This idea was reinforced in Mahe v. 
Alberta, wherein the Supreme Court held that the language guarantee set 
forth in section 23 of the Charter is an exception to the equality provisions 
of section 15 in that it accords the English and the French “special status in 
comparison to all other linguistic groups in Canada”.13 The result is that the 
special status of the language provisions, and especially section 23, creates 
something of “a Charter within a Charter”.14  
The more frequent issue to appear before courts and tribunals, 
however, is a purported conflict among or between Charter rights and 
other legal rights. The processes that legal decision-makers have 
employed in resolving those conflicts, and the hierarchy of rights that has 
emerged as a result, is the focus of this paper. 
III. THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 
Resolving conflicts of rights between individuals or groups has 
become increasingly more important in Canadian jurisprudence, both 
because of growing awareness of the significance of individual rights and 
the proliferation of legislation and other instruments expanding or 
codifying those rights. These include the Charter, various provincial 
human rights codes, individual statutes providing for legislative rights, 
and certain international treaties and conventions. As a result, situations 
in which rights conflicts arise depend on the source of the right being 
asserted. These conflicts include a clash of Charter rights, clashes of 
code rights, conflicts between a Charter right and a code right, or 
between a code right and a legislative right, or between a code right and 
a common law right.15 The increasing number and sources of rights leads 
to a corresponding increase in clashes of rights. 
1. Balancing or Reconciling? 
Much has been written about the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
problem of how to resolve collisions of rights between private 
                                                                                                                       
12 Id., at para. 186, quoting André Tremblay, “The Language Rights (ss. 16 to 23)” in  
W.S. Tarnopolsky & G.A. Beaudoin, eds., The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1982), at 445-46. 
13 [1990] S.C.J. No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, at 369 (S.C.C.). 
14 Mark Carter, “An Analysis of the ‘No Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights Doctrine’” 
(2006) 12 Rev. Const. Stud. 19, at 28. 
15 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Competing Human Rights (2012), at 14-17. 
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individuals.16 Writing extrajudicially, Justice Frank Iacobucci has argued 
that the proper approach to such conflicts is through a “reconciliation”, 
rather than a “balancing”, process.17 In his view, a balancing approach 
such as that contemplated in R. v. Oakes18 should be confined to claims 
against a state actor, and involves “assigning primacy to one right over 
another right or interest after having weighed the relevant 
considerations”.19 Reconciliation, on the other hand, is an exercise 
wherein courts attempt to define the content and scope of rights in 
relation to one another: 
The most obvious difference between “balancing” under section 1 and 
“reconciling” Charter rights stems from the nature of the actors 
involved. Under section 1, the state must justify a violation of an 
individual’s Charter rights. When reconciling competing Charter rights, 
on the other hand, a court seeks to reconcile the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of one individual with those of another.20 
Admittedly, the terms “reconciliation” and “balancing” have often 
been used interchangeably,21 sowing some confusion in both the cases 
and commentary. There is, however, a fundamental distinction between 
the two approaches that is dependent on the onus of proof. Under a 
section 1 analysis, the state must justify a violation of an individual’s 
rights, with the result that the courts are charged with balancing the 
injury to the claimant’s Charter right with the collective public interest in 
the Charter infringement. In making this assessment, courts are expected  
 
                                                                                                                       
16 See, e.g., Jena McGill, “‘Now It’s My Rights Versus Yours’: Equality in Tension with 
Religious Freedoms” (2016) 53 Alta. L. Rev. 583; Cara Faith Zwibel, “Reconciling Rights: The 
Whatcott Case as Missed Opportunity” (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 313; Patricia Hughes, “Resiling 
from Reconciling?: Musing on R. v. Kapp” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 255; Christina Szurlej, 
“Reconciling Competing Human Rights in Canada” (2015) 47 Peace Research 179. 
17 The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 140-43. Over the 
years, the Supreme Court appears to have used the terms, “balancing” and “reconciliation” 
interchangeably when referring to cases of competing Charter rights: Christina Szurlej, “Reconciling 
Competing Human Rights in Canada” (2015) 47 Peace Research 179, at 182. 
18 [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at paras. 69-71 (S.C.C.). 
19 The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 141. 
20 The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 141. See also  
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 
at 438-39 (S.C.C.). 
21 Jena McGill, “‘Now It’s My Rights Versus Yours’: Equality in Tension with Religious 
Freedoms” (2016) 53 Alta. L. Rev. 583, at 587. 
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to take into account a wide variety of societal factors. The challenge is 
to decide “whether the enacting legislative body has made the 
appropriate compromise between the civil libertarian value guaranteed 
by the Charter and the competing social or economic objectives 
pursued by the law”.22 
In the reconciliation context, on the other hand, there is “no rule about 
onus per se”.23 Instead, the claims of both parties must be considered 
equally, and each must be construed in such a way as to give the asserted 
right the fullest possible expression. This is a function of two principles 
that are said to underlie the interpretation of Charter rights. The first is 
the rule that no Charter right is absolute.24 Application of Charter values 
must, therefore, “take into account other interests and in particular other 
Charter values which may conflict with their unrestricted and literal 
enforcement”.25 The second principle said to support the reconciliation 
framework is the assertion that there is no hierarchy of rights.26 Together, 
these two principles lead to the conclusion that resolving conflicts 
between two or more competing rights requires that some compromise be 
reached wherein both rights are given expression, so that no right in 
particular may be said to trump another. 
Although proponents of the reconciliation approach assert its 
superiority over the balancing process of the section 1 Oakes test 
jurisprudence, in reality, there is little difference between the two.27 This 
is because, in the end, courts are still required to engage in a balancing 
process regardless of which method judges propose to use. To be sure, 
Iacobucci J.’s reconciliation approach is more circumscribed than that 
required in a traditional section 1 analysis, in that it takes into account 
fewer factors than are taken into consideration in the Oakes test  
 
                                                                                                                       
22 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 33-10. 
See also R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 67 (S.C.C.). 
23 The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 142. 
24 R. v. Crawford; R. v. Creighton, [1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858, at para. 34 
(S.C.C.) (Charter rights “are not absolute in the sense that they cannot be applied to their full extent 
regardless of the context”). See also R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 
61 (S.C.C.). 
25 R. v. Crawford; R. v. Creighton, id. 
26 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 825, 
at 877 (S.C.C.). 
27 See, e.g., Patricia Hughes, “Resiling from Reconciling? Musing on R. v. Kapp” (2009) 47 
S.C.L.R. 255 (noting at 255 that “the rhetoric of reconciliation and balancing has often been stronger 
than its achievement”). 
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balancing exercise, but both section 1 balancing and reconciliation still 
require that courts eventually give preference to one right over another. 
Where there is a true clash of rights, one of them must ultimately yield, 
and it is left to judges to decide which that will be. In making that 
decision, judges are called upon to balance which right is more deserving 
of protection or priority than the other. The means by which they do so is 
by considering the two rights in comparison and ultimately making a 
value judgment between them. Thus, it is obvious that “it is not realistic 
that in all cases the rights can be shaped in a way that everyone’s 
interests are protected to some degree”.28 On the contrary, “depending on 
the way a right is defined, the practical effect of reconciliation may be 
that one right is subordinated to another”.29 
The balancing test inherent in the reconciliation approach is a result 
of the Supreme Court’s repeated assertion that reconciling conflicts of 
rights cannot be undertaken in a vacuum, but must instead be based 
upon an analysis of the entire factual and legal context.30 It is only 
after considering the exercise of both rights in the particular factual 
situation that courts can be justified in undertaking the process of 
determining the extent to which the competing rights may be 
exercised. Put more simply, the court must consider the factual context 
to determine which right must be given priority. In so doing, the court 
essentially weighs the benefits of allowing the exercise of one right 
against the burdens such exercise would impose on the other.31 
Consequently, slight variations in the facts might result in a different 
conclusion to the reconciliation exercise. As Abella J. noted in her 
dissent in Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR, inc., “[T]here is 
a difference between yelling ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre and yelling 
‘theatre’ in a crowded fire station.”32 
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court itself has 
never officially adopted Justice Iacobucci’s reconciliation approach. 
Indeed, other justices have criticized reconciliation on the grounds that  
 
                                                                                                                       
28 Id., at 259. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 21 (S.C.C.). See 
also R. v. S. (N.), [2010] O.J. No. 4306, 95 O.R. (3d) 735, at para. 97 (Ont. C.A.) (“Reconciling 
competing Charter values is necessarily fact-specific. Context is vital and context is variable”). 
31 Christina Szurlej, “Reconciling Competing Human Rights in Canada” (2015) 47 Peace 
Research 179, at 185. 
32 [2011] S.C.J. No. 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214, at para. 96 (S.C.C.). 
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the “Charter makes no provision for directly balancing constitutional 
rights against one another”.33 On the contrary, in the view of some of the 
justices, section 1 is “the only balancing mechanism provided under the 
Charter”.34 This is because the reconciliation approach is effectively an 
attempt “to limit a right by another, with no stated mechanism for 
judicially determining just when, on the facts, the first right is 
overridden”.35 Moreover Justice Iacobucci himself has admitted that the 
reconciliation framework “clearly reflects the substance of the Oakes test 
when assessing legislation under s. 1 of the Charter”.36 Thus, “[t]he 
analyses involved in reconciling rights often involve a consideration of 
the deleterious effects of the measures which limit the right in question 
and the objective sought to be achieved by the limitation of the right, as 
well as a consideration of the deleterious and salutary effects of the 
measures themselves.”37 In his view, this “directly reflects the approach 
taken in part 3 of the [Oakes] proportionality analysis”.38 
Consequently, it appears that the only real difference between the 
section 1 balancing and the purported reconciliation approach remains 
the range of factors to be considered in the analysis. An Oakes-type 
balancing test requires the reviewing court to consider a wider array of 
socio-economic facts than would be necessary in a clash of rights 
between private individuals. In effect, section 1 balancing requires that a 
court consider “whether the enacting legislative body has made the 
appropriate compromise between the civil libertarian value guaranteed 
by the Charter and the competing social or economic objectives pursued 
by the law”.39 Reconciling rights, on the other hand, requires merely that  
 
                                                                                                                       
33 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315, at para. 118 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. 
34 Id. See also Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 94 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting); Law 
Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32, at 
para. 304 (S.C.C.), per Brown J. (dissenting) (“[T]he Oakes test — must apply to justify state 
infringements of Charter rights, regardless of the context in which they occur”). 
35 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315, at para. 119 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. 
36 The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 145, citing 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 877 
(S.C.C.). 
37 Id., at 157. 
38 Id. 
39 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 33-10. 
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the court establish the extent to which existing Charter rights might be 
exercised in a discrete situation. Thus, “the exercise of reconciling rights 
does not necessarily mean a full exploration of a Charter infringement, as 
one would expect with a direct Charter challenge”.40 
How, then, does this balancing of salutary and deleterious effects 
work in practise? A review of the cases indicates that it is a rather rough 
and ready sort of justice, for one very obvious reason: There are no set 
standards. Nor could there be.41 The insistence on a contextual approach 
necessarily means that every case is different and that “a different 
[factual] relationship may be struck between various Charter rights in 
one case from that in another”.42 Moreover, the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission insists that one important part of the balancing process 
requires a consideration of the underlying values of Canadian society as 
reflected in both statute and case law, along with a consideration of both 
individual and group rights.43 Thus, whilst courts might establish a 
general principle, the application of the principle in any given case is 
entirely dependent on the particular facts. 
Finally, it should be noted that Justice Iacobucci’s reconciliation 
process was developed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Doré v. 
Barreau du Québec,44 which created a new framework for the review of 
administrative decisions that impact Charter rights. Under this new 
framework, administrative agencies are entitled to deference when their 
decisions adversely impact the exercise of an individual’s Charter rights. 
This deference is justified on the basis of the administrative decision-
maker’s expertise in the interpretation and implementation of its own 
statutory mandate as well as its “proximity to the facts of the case”.45  
Under Doré, in considering a claim that a particular action would 
violate a Charter right, an administrative agency should, first, consider 
the statutory objectives that lie behind the decision. Thereafter, it “should 
ask how the Charter value at issue will best be protected in view of the  
 
                                                                                                                       
40 The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 143. 
41 Christina Szurlej, “Reconciling Competing Human Rights in Canada” (2015) 47 Peace 
Research 179, at 183. 
42 The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 156. 
43 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Competing Human Rights (2012), at 23. 
44 [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.). 
45 Id., at para. 54. 
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statutory objectives”.46 There is, in other words, a “proportionate 
balancing” in which the administrative agency must ensure that decision 
it proposes to take “interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee no 
more than is necessary given the statutory objectives. If the decision is 
disproportionately impairing of the guarantee, it is unreasonable. If, on 
the other hand, it reflects a proper balance of the mandate with Charter 
protection, it is a reasonable one.”47 
Proportionate balancing might, therefore, be seen to be a truncated 
version of the traditional section 1 balancing approach. Although the 
Supreme Court notes in Doré that the traditional Oakes test is not 
appropriate to administrative decision-making,48 the Doré framework is 
intended to find “analytical harmony” with the minimal impairment and 
balancing stages of the Oakes test.49 
The Doré framework, which was further developed in Loyola,50 may, 
therefore, be regarded as a subset of the traditional balancing approach 
for two reasons. First, it is applicable to claims that a decision by a state 
actor infringes Charter rights, and, thus, is effectively a claim that a right 
has been impaired “by law”. Second, although the full Oakes test might 
not be applicable, the Doré/Loyola proportionate balancing test “works 
the same justificatory muscles”, the intent of which is to balance a claim 
of private party against the state, rather than resolve claims between two 
private parties.51 
In the end, both section 1 balancing (whether undertaken in full in 
accordance with Oakes or in the more truncated version provided for in 
the Doré/Loyola framework), as well as Justice Iacobucci’s 
reconciliation approach, require that at some point courts weigh benefits 
and burdens on some imaginary scale to give priority to one interest over 
another. In the case of Oakes and Doré, the task is to determine whether 
the statute or administrative action justifiably infringes a claimed Charter 
right. In reconciliation, the task is to determine whether one Charter 
                                                                                                                       
46 Id., at para. 56. 
47 Id., at para. 7; Loyola High School v.  Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, at para. 32 (S.C.C.). 
48 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, at para. 37 
(S.C.C.). 
49 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 
2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). 
50 Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
613, at paras. 3-4, 35-42 (S.C.C.). 
51 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, at para. 5 
(S.C.C.). 
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claim ought to take priority over another. Resolving both types of cases 
requires a proportional balancing of interests. 
2. Resolving Conflicts of Rights 
In actuality, however, it appears that when confronting cases 
involving a clash of rights, courts utilize a two-step process of 
delineation (or definition) and balancing. They begin by delineating the 
scope of the right at issue to ascertain whether there is, in fact, an actual 
conflict between two competing Charter rights. In some cases, it is 
possible to define the conflict out of existence through a narrow 
definition of rights.52 Where definition does not eliminate the conflict, 
then the two rights must be balanced against each other. Once properly 
defined, the corresponding salutary and deleterious effects of the rights 
can then be weighed against each other with a view toward determining 
which right will ultimately be given priority. 
(a) Definition 
The first step in resolving a conflict of rights is through the process of 
definition. In a number of cases, courts have been able to eliminate 
conflicts between rights by defining the scope of an asserted right 
narrowly and in such a way as to make the conflict disappear. For 
example, in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,53 
the Supreme Court considered the extent to which parents might refuse 
life-saving medical treatment to their minor child on the grounds that 
their religious beliefs prohibited administering the treatment proposed by 
the child’s doctors. Confronted with a life-threatening situation, the 
Children’s Aid Society brought an action seeking to take wardship of  
the child and thereby provide the requisite consent to the treatment. On 
the face of it, the case presented a conflict between the parents’ right “to 
rear their children according to their religious beliefs, including that of 
choosing medical and other treatments”54 and the child’s section 7 right 
to life, liberty and security. 
                                                                                                                       
52 See, e.g., B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.); Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 29 (S.C.C.). 
53 [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.). 
54 Id., at para. 105. 
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Although the Court was unanimous in limiting the parents’ right to 
refuse the proposed treatment, the justices were divided over the proper 
approach to the problem. The majority, led by La Forest J., considered 
that the right to consent to medical treatment on behalf of a minor child 
was a fundamental aspect of the parents’ liberty55 and religious56 rights 
under the Charter. The Court then engaged in a section 1 balancing and 
concluded that the state had a “pressing and substantial” interest in 
overriding the parents’ Charter rights. The parents’ liberty and religious 
rights had to give way where unfettered exercise of their freedoms would 
result in a denial of potentially life-saving treatment to their minor 
child.57 
Writing separately, three justices undertook to resolve the clash of 
rights through a process of definition. With regard to the section 7 claim, 
they defined the liberty interest as not including a parent’s right to deny a 
child medical treatment that has been adjudged necessary by a medical 
professional.58 Similarly, in considering the religious freedom claim, the 
minority defined the scope of the section 2(a) guarantee narrowly to 
include “the right to educate and rear their child in the tenets of their 
faith”.59 On the other hand, they said, “a parent’s freedom of religion 
does not include the imposition upon the child of religious practices 
which threaten the safety, health or life of the child”.60 In their view, no 
conflict of rights existed because the rights the parents were seeking to 
exercise were not themselves within the scope of any constitutional 
guarantee. By narrowly construing the parents’ section 7 liberty interest, 
                                                                                                                       
55 Id., at para. 83 (“… I would have thought it plain that the right to nurture a child, to care 
for its development, and to make decisions for it in fundamental matters such as medical care, are 
part of the liberty interest of a parent”). 
56 Id., at para. 105 (“It seems to me that the right of parents to rear their children according 
to their religious beliefs, including that of choosing medical and other treatments, is an equally 
fundamental aspect of freedom of religion”). 
57 With regard to the s. 7 claim, the parents ultimately agreed that the state might intervene 
in order to protect children. The complaint thus resolved itself into a question of whether the process 
used by the state was commensurate with principles of fundamental justice. The Court concluded it 
did: id., at paras. 89, 101. On the question of the s. 2(a) claim, the Court concluded that if the process 
used complied with the principles of fundamental justice, it largely met the burden required under  
s. 1: id., at paras. 111-113. 
58 Id., at para. 212 (Corey, Iacobucci and Major JJ.). Writing separately, Lamer C.J.C. drew 
a similar conclusion, holding that the liberty interest protected by s. 7 is limited to “the physical 
dimension of the word ‘liberty,’ which can be lost through the operation of the legal system”: id., at 
para. 22. 
59 Id., at para. 223. 
60 Id., at para. 225. 
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as well as the right to freedom of religion, the minority was effectively 
able to make the conflict go away. 
Another example of using the definitional process to resolve an 
apparent conflict of rights is found in Trinity Western University v. 
British Columbia College of Teachers.61 The British Columbia College of 
Teachers (“BCCT”) denied accreditation to the education program of 
Trinity Western University (“TWU”) on the grounds that the school’s 
“community standards”, which prohibited homosexual behaviour by 
members of the TWU community, constituted a discriminatory practice 
based on sexual orientation. TWU claimed that the BCCT’s decision 
violated the university’s right to religious freedom, as well as the equality 
rights of both prospective students and students in the schools in which 
TWU’s graduates might eventually teach. 
As in B. (R.), the Court concluded that this was a case “where any 
potential conflict should be resolved through the proper delineation of 
the rights and values involved”.62 It then defined the rights involved 
thusly: 
[T]he proper place to draw the line in cases like the one at bar is 
generally between belief and conduct. The freedom to hold beliefs is 
broader than the freedom to act on them. Absent concrete evidence that 
training teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in the public schools of 
B.C., the freedom of individuals to adhere to certain religious beliefs 
while at TWU should be respected. The BCCT, rightfully, does not 
require public universities with teacher education programs to screen 
out applicants who hold sexist, racist or homophobic beliefs. For better 
or for worse, tolerance of divergent beliefs is a hallmark of a 
democratic society.63 
The definition process allowed the Court to eliminate the conflict by 
effectively limiting the definition of freedom of religion to belief and not 
conduct. In so doing, the Court was able to make a distinction between 
the situation of TWU students from that of the teacher in Ross v. New 
Brunswick School District No. 15.64 Unlike the teacher in Ross, whose 
out-of-school conduct had “poisoned the atmosphere of the school”,65 
there was no evidence that TWU graduates had, or would, engage in 
                                                                                                                       
61 [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.). 
62 Id., at para. 29. 
63 Id., at para. 36. 
64 [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.). 
65 Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 19 (S.C.C.). 
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discriminatory conduct toward students in their care.66 In the event that 
any TWU graduates engaged in misconduct, they would be subject to 
discipline by the regulator. However, until then, they were free to hold 
whatever beliefs they chose and TWU was free to establish whatever 
conduct policy it believed was consistent with its religious mission for 
those who wanted to be part of its community.67 
This tactic of essentially “reading down” rights has been used by 
courts as a means of prioritizing certain rights over others, mainly in the 
religion context, but in other contexts as well. When confronted with a 
conflict of Charter rights, the definition exercise allows a decision-maker 
to effectively eliminate a conflict by narrowly construing the scope of a 
claimed right. In many cases, the apparent conflict will simply disappear.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the process of definition is itself 
largely an arbitrary one. It effectively permits courts and tribunals to 
determine the core elements of a particular right in ways that are 
unconnected with any objective standard. B. (R.) is, again, a good 
example of this problem. As noted above, the justices were deeply 
divided on the scope of the section 7 liberty right. Thus, Lamer C.J.C. 
asserted that the liberty interest was limited to the criminal context and 
did not include either the right to bring up children or the right to choose 
medical treatment for them.68 Justices La Forest, Gonthier and 
McLachlin, on the other hand, came to the opposite conclusion and held 
that the liberty interest included parents’ right to make medical decisions 
for their children.69 Meanwhile, Iacobucci, Major and Cory JJ. held that 
section 7 did include the right of parents to make medical decisions for 
their children, but that this right did not include the power “to deny a 
child medical treatment that has been adjudged necessary by a medical 
professional”.70 In the end, all of the justices agreed in the result, but the 
definitional process was largely arbitrary. As will be seen below in Hall 
(Litigation guardian of) v. Powers71 and Law Society of British Columbia 
v. Trinity Western University,72 the definition process can become an 
integral tool in advancing the policy choices of judges. 
                                                                                                                       
66 Id., at para. 35. 
67 Id., at para. 3. 
68 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315, at paras. 1, 36 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C.  
69 Id., at para. 85, per La Forest J. 
70 Id., at para. 212, per Iacobucci J. 
71 [2002] O.J. No. 1803, 59 O.R. (3d) 423 (Ont. S.C.J.).  
72 [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). 
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(b) Balancing 
Assuming that a conflict of rights between two private parties cannot 
be eliminated through the process of definition, there must be a 
consideration of whether the proposed infringement or interference is 
minor or trivial. If it is, then the claimed right is not likely to receive 
protection.73 If there is a substantial interference, then it will be necessary 
to move on to a balancing process. Courts will then be required to 
balance the two conflicting rights, using a benefits and burdens analysis. 
The salutary and deleterious effects of the exercise of the conflicting 
rights are weighed in an effort to establish which should be given 
priority. 
In some cases, the balance is rather easily struck, as for example, in 
the case of speech that incites imminent violence against a minority 
group. The definition process can make the conflict disappear by simply 
defining the conduct at issue as not being speech at all, but rather 
violence in and of itself.74 Where that process fails to resolve the conflict, 
a balancing approach would allow the speech to be limited because the 
deleterious effects on the equality rights of the targeted group clearly 
outweigh the salutary benefits that might come from permitting the 
speech to continue.75  
(c) Policy Preference and Instrumentalism 
It is important to note that the contextual approach to both delineation 
and balancing means that judges and other decision-makers are able to 
interpret the content of various Charter rights in an ad hoc fashion, 
divorced from any consistent principle. For example, when it comes to 
the process of definition, there is no precise standard for determining the 
boundaries of the definitional exercise. While judges frequently resort to 
maxims such as, “no right is absolute”,76 or that all rights must be 
“defined in light of competing claims”,77 in the end, they are largely free 
to define a right in individual cases as seems best to them under the 
                                                                                                                       
73 Reema Khawja, The Shadow of the Law: Surveying the Case Law Dealing with 
Competing Rights Claims (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2012), at 6. 
74 R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.). 
75 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 
(S.C.C.). 
76 R. v. Crawford; R. v. Creighton, [1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858, at para. 34 
(S.C.C.). 
77 R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 61 (S.C.C.). 
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circumstances. Indeed, the fact that nine justices produced three different 
definitions of the liberty interest contained in section 7, as was the case 
in B. (R.), should indicate that there is a great deal of arbitrariness in the 
process.78 Similarly, the balancing process which follows the definitional 
exercise is equally untethered from principle. There are no set standards 
for determining what factors ought to be placed on the scale in any 
particular case. 
In short, while many judges today describe the definitional and 
balancing processes in a way that gives the impression of neutral law-
making, the reality is that the entire exercise is rather instrumentalist in 
nature and gives judges free rein to advance their own policy 
preferences. No doubt, many would disagree with this characterization as 
unduly tendentious. However, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin herself 
long ago admitted: 
[With the advent of the Charter, a] whole range of questions touching 
everyday life which were formerly matters exclusively for the 
legislators are now fodder for the courts .... The result has been that 
judges, particularly at the appellate level, find themselves facing 
questions which are new and unfamiliar. Many involve social and 
moral values, foreign territory to a judge raised on the arid objectivity 
of contracts and bills of lading. It is not enough to demand, as one 
writer recently did, that our judges “stop trying to be our moral mentors 
and get back to deciding cases”. As I have already suggested, the 
proposed distinction between “deciding cases” and engaging in 
evaluative moral questions is a false dichotomy. There is no way to 
interpret the Charter without making value judgments.79 
It will also be argued that what the judges are, in fact, doing is merely 
reading the zeitgeist, interpreting the Charter in the context of Canadian 
values. Thus, it is said that judges “examine the values on which the 
conflict arises and decide which is most in keeping with the purposes of 
the Charter guarantee in question”.80 This reference to “external values 
will ensure that the judge does not decide on the basis of his or her 
prejudices”.81 Again, this sounds like a neutral principle, but ultimately, 
leaving judges to decide what is “most in keeping” with Charter values 
still requires them to make a personal choice as to what each thinks those 
                                                                                                                       
78 See text accompanying notes 53-54, supra. 
79 Madame Justice B.M. McLachlin, “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?” (1991) 
29 Alta. L. Rev. 540, at 542-43 (emphasis added; references omitted). 
80 Id., at 547. 
81 Id. 
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values might be. How else to explain the great differences in the various 
courts’ view of the same case? For example, how is it that the Quebec 
Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the injunction against the succah in 
Amselem,82 whilst the Supreme Court rejected it? Or, how is it that the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the Law Society 
of British Columbia’s decision to refuse accreditation to Trinity Western 
University’s law school,83 while the Supreme Court came to precisely the 
opposite conclusion? The answer, of course, is clear: All of the judges 
involved were making personal determinations as to what they believed 
was “most in keeping” with Charter values, with the result that decisions 
turn on the preferences of those who ultimately get the final say. Value 
judgments are, therefore, “inherent in defining the scope of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter”.84 
This is especially true in cases that arise in administrative tribunals 
and decided under the Doré/Loyola framework.85 Given that the Supreme 
Court has adopted a standard of reasonableness when reviewing the 
decisions of administrative tribunals,86 the discretion afforded these 
agencies is arguably far broader than that given to lower courts. This is 
because, as currently constructed, the Doré/Loyola framework does not 
necessarily require an administrative decision-maker to state with 
specificity the precise factors that went into its analysis. Indeed, after the 
decision in Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western 
University, it does not appear that an administrative tribunal need 
provide any detailed explanation as to precisely what factors it took into 
consideration in its proportional balancing.87 
                                                                                                                       
82 Amselem v. Syndicat Northcrest, [2002] Q.J. No. 705, [2002] R.J.Q. 906 (Que. C.A.). 
83 Trinity Western University v. Law Society of British Columbia, [2016] B.C.J. No. 2252, 
2016 BCCA 423 (B.C.C.A.). 
84 Madame Justice B.M. McLachlin, “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?” (1991) 
29 Alta. L. Rev. 540, at 545. See also R. v. J. (K.R.), [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, at 
para. 79 (S.C.C.), wherein the majority observed that the proportionality step of the Oakes test 
“allows courts to stand back to determine on a normative basis whether a rights infringement is 
justified in a free and democratic society. Although this examination entails difficult value 
judgments, it is preferable to make these judgments explicit, as doing so enhances the transparency 
and intelligibility of the ultimate decision.” 
85 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.); Loyola 
High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
86 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, id., at paras. 56-57. See also Law Society of British 
Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 32, at paras. 79-82 
(S.C.C.). 
87 See, e.g., Côté and Brown JJ.’s discussion of the decision-making process in Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32, at paras. 294-300 
(S.C.C.). 
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Finally, there is the question of “Charter values”. The use of these 
unwritten principles to inform the definition and balancing process is 
problematic in the extreme. As Côté and Brown JJ. noted in their dissent 
in the Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 
“resorting to Charter values as a counterweight to constitutionalized and 
judicially defined Charter rights is a highly questionable practice”.88 
This is again because the use of Charter values opens the door to 
unfettered judicial or administrative discretion: 
… Charter “values” — unlike Charter rights, which are the product of 
constitutional settlement — are unsourced. They are, therefore, entirely 
the product of the idiosyncrasies of the judicial mind that pronounces 
them to be so. And, perhaps one judge’s understanding of “equality” 
might indeed represent a “shared value” with all Canadians, but 
perhaps another judge’s might not. This in and of itself should call into 
question the legitimacy of judges or other state actors pronouncing 
certain “values” to be “shared”. Canadians are permitted to hold 
different sets of values. One person’s values may be another person’s 
anathema. We see nothing troubling in this, so long as each person 
agrees to the other’s right to hold and act upon those values in a manner 
consistent with the limits of core minimal civil commitments which are 
necessary to secure civic order — none of which are implicated here. 
What is troubling, however, is the imposition of judicially preferred 
“values” to limit constitutionally protected rights, including the right to 
hold other values.89 
All this means, of course, that the resolution of conflicts of rights 
depends on the choices being made by judges in each case. Depending 
then on a judge’s inclinations, the definitional exercise that often takes 
place at the outset of a rights reconciliation case will, in many cases, 
determine the ultimate result. In the event that the conflict is not 
eliminated through the definitional exercise, the balancing process may 
also be used to achieve a particular result depending on what judges 
decide to put on the scales. Thus, “[a]lthough Canadian courts 
consistently use ‘the language of balancing and accommodation, there is 
rarely any consideration of how this balancing would actually be 
                                                                                                                       
88 Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, id., at para. 307 (S.C.C.). 
See also para. 166 (Rowe J., concurring) (“While Doré was intended to clarify the relationship 
between the Charter and administrative action, its reliance on values rather than rights has muddled 
the adjudication of Charter claims in the administrative context”). 
89 Id., at para. 308 (emphasis in original). 
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undertaken in hard cases’”.90 Judges are thus left free with respect to 
what items, precisely, are put on the balance in any given case. 
(d) A Spectrum Analysis 
In most cases, the actual balancing process takes place within the 
context of a “spectrum analysis”. Where there is an infringement or 
interference with an activity that is closely connected to the “core” of a 
protected Charter right, the infringement will be deemed unjustified. On 
the other hand, the further an activity is from the core of a protected 
right, the more likely it is to be subordinated to a competing right.  
For example, where property rights conflict with equality rights, 
property claims almost invariably lose out to equality or religious rights, 
unless the property claim being asserted is very near the core of another 
right, usually the exercise of religion. Thus, property or economic rights 
will lose out to equality unless the property right is being asserted by a 
religious organization related to a religious practice, or a person 
exercising a religious right that is directly connected to a property or 
economic claim. Similarly, speech rights, including speech motivated by 
religious belief, are subordinated to equality, unless the speech is closely 
related to religious practice or may be considered comment on matters of 
public policy or administration. However, even the exercise of religion 
itself has been made subordinate to equality claims where the exercise of 
a religious right in the public sphere would interfere with another 
person’s or group’s demand for equal treatment. A number of examples 
of these “spectrum analysis” outcomes are discussed below. 
IV. THE HIERARCHY OF “COMMON RIGHTS” 
At present, it seems clear that Canadian jurisprudence has already 
established the outlines of a hierarchy of rights where the “common 
rights” of the Charter are concerned. These rights include the 
fundamental freedoms of section 2, the legal rights of sections 7 to 14 
and the equality right in section 15. The common rights might also be 
considered to include traditional freedoms recognized at common law, 
                                                                                                                       
90 Jena McGill, “‘Now It’s My Rights Versus Yours’: Equality in Tension with Religious 
Freedoms” (2016) 53 Alta. L. Rev. 583, at 589, quoting Carl F. Stychin, “Faith in the Future: 
Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere” (2009) 29 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 729, at 749 (footnote 
omitted; emphasis in original). 
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such as the freedom of contract or the right to own and dispose of 
property.91 Although not specifically recognized in the Charter, these 
economic rights are an integral part of the Anglo-Canadian legal and 
constitutional heritage.92 This is because section 26 provides that the 
Charter “shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other 
rights or freedoms that exist in Canada”. Consequently, economic rights, 
including property and contract rights, remain protected under the 
common law, the Canadian Bill of Rights93 and provincial statutes.94 
A review of the cases, especially within the past decade, indicates that 
courts and human rights tribunals do, on balance, privilege certain rights 
above others. Among those at the top of the hierarchy are what might be 
referred to as “dignity” rights, which is to say rights that implicate an 
individual’s concept of identity or self-worth. These include freedom of 
religion, of conscience, and equality rights. In the middle are rights 
related to participation in society, such as rights of speech or association. 
At the bottom are property and economic rights. Moreover, it can be seen 
that when it comes to the “dignity” rights themselves, equality has, and  
 
                                                                                                                       
91 See, e.g., Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1(a): 
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue 
to exist ... the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely ... 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of 
property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law; 
92 See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927, at 1003-1004 (S.C.C.): 
The intentional exclusion of property from s. 7, and the substitution therefor of “security of 
the person” has, in our estimation, a dual effect. First, it leads to a general inference that 
economic rights as generally encompassed by the term “property” are not within the 
perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee. This is not to declare, however, that no right with an 
economic component can fall within “security of the person”. Lower courts have found that 
the rubric of “economic rights” embraces a broad spectrum of interests, ranging from such 
rights, included in various international covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for 
equal work, adequate food, clothing and shelter, to traditional property — contract rights. To 
exclude all of these at this early moment in the history of Charter interpretation seems to us to 
be precipitous. We do not, at this moment, choose to pronounce upon whether those 
economic rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though they are of 
the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights.  
93 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
94 See, e.g., Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at para. 85 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J.:  
[T]he Canadian Bill of Rights retains all its force and effect, together with the various 
provincial charters of rights. Because these constitutional or quasi-constitutional 
instruments are drafted differently, they are susceptible of producing cumulative effects 
for the better protection of rights and freedoms. But this beneficial result will be lost if 
these instruments fall into neglect. It is particularly so where they contain provisions not 
to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms …. 
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apparently will continue to have, precedence over religion and 
conscience, except in very limited circumstances. As a result, one might 
discern the current hierarchy of rights is as follows: 
 
In advancing this claim, this article will examine cases from the 
Supreme Court, the provincial courts and the various human rights 
tribunals. Focusing only on Supreme Court cases tends to give a 
limited perspective due to the infrequent nature of Supreme Court 
appeals. Moreover, while it is true that in most cases, provincial 
human rights tribunals do not interpret the Charter per se, they do 
explore the boundaries of rights analogous to those in the Charter. 
And, while it is also true that most human rights codes apply far more 
broadly than the Charter, as for example including private actors as 
well as government, the substantive content of many of the rights 
contained in the codes is similar to those in the Charter. Thus, human 
rights tribunals interpreting speech or religious rights do so in a 
manner akin to those of the courts, and indeed, frequently rely on 
judicial development of the Charter to inform their interpretation. 
Consequently, fundamental rights in Canada are evolving across a 
broad range of activity and by a wide range of judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. Therefore, a proper understanding of rights cannot be 
had without considering this wider universe of opinion.  
1. Property Rights versus Dignity Rights 
At the bottom of the hierarchy are property rights. Indeed, it seems 
clear that property and economic rights will lose out to religious, 
speech and equality rights in almost every case. One reason for this, of 
course, is that property rights are not explicitly found in the Charter 
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and, therefore, conflicts between economic rights and religious or 
equality rights present a conflict between Charter and common law 
rights. Given the constitutional status of the Charter, one would expect 
that economic rights would yield. Nonetheless, as noted above, 
economic rights are worthy of some protection by virtue of both the 
Canadian Bill of Rights (at least with respect to federal legislation) 
and, perhaps even section 7 of the Charter, with the result that they 
cannot simply be ignored. As a result, many commentators insist that 
section 7 must be interpreted as “not including property, as not 
including freedom of contract, and, in short, as not including economic 
liberty”.95 For its part, however, the Supreme Court has been less 
definitive on the point.96 The Court has thus far interpreted section 7 as 
implicated only where the state has acted to deprive a person of life, 
liberty or security by means of the criminal law or some significant 
adverse administrative action.97 While there have been calls to 
interpret section 7 to create a positive right to economic security, the 
Court has declined the invitation to do so.98 However, several justices 
have suggested that section 7 might be invoked in circumstances 
unrelated to the justice system and some have expressed the opinion 
that the traditional rule “unduly circumscribes the scope of the section, 
in a manner contrary to the cautious, but open, approach” adopted by 
the Court in other cases.99 
Yet, notwithstanding the view that economic rights do not receive 
Charter protection, Canadian courts have considered the interplay 
between dignity rights and contract/property rights on several 
occasions. In cases where they have done so, courts have recognized 
that economic rights deserve protection when they are themselves 
manifestations of religious activity or protected speech. Thus, a 
religious group might have the right to refuse to rent out a church 
building for a same-sex wedding where doing so would be contrary to 
                                                                                                                       
95 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 
47.7(b) (emphasis in original). 
96 See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927, at 1003-1004 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C. 
97 See Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at 
para. 77 (S.C.C.). 
98 Id., at paras. 307-358, per Arbour J. (dissenting). 
99 Id., at para. 414, per LeBel J. (dissenting). An interesting discussion of the importance of 
negative/positive rights distinction in s. 7 may be found in Emmett Macfarlane, “Dialogue, 
Remedies, and Positive Rights: Carter v. Canada as Microcosm for Past and Future Issues under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2017) 49 Ottawa L. Rev. 107. 
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the tenets of the faith, but an individual operating a B&B would not be 
able to discriminate against a same-sex couple in the renting of a 
room, even if such a rental would offend his sincerely held religious 
beliefs. The former falls clearly within an area of activity that is at the 
heart of religious practice, while the latter is more attenuated. 
Similarly, a newspaper might be able to refuse to print material 
advocating for or against racial preferences in hiring on the grounds 
that doing so would conflict with its own editorial position, but it 
would not be entitled to reject advertising simply based on the 
prospective client’s race. The former case involves the potential for 
forced speech violating a publisher’s right to free expression, while the 
latter has little, if anything, to do with legitimate debate. Put more 
simply, where traditional common law property and contract rights 
conflict with dignity rights, courts have almost uniformly subordinated 
these economic interests unless the exercise of the economic right is 
itself an expression of a Charter right. Consequently, property rights 
trump other rights only where they are themselves closely connected to 
the core of a dignity right. In that case, the economic activity becomes 
a proxy for the underlying dignity right. Where, however, the property 
or contract right is largely divorced from the exercise of any protected 
Charter right, it is almost always subordinated to the conflicting 
dignity right. As a result, it is only where there is a clash between 
dignity rights that the courts must engage in a true balancing test. 
One end of the spectrum is represented by a series of cases 
involving property owned by religious organizations. Thus, in 
Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb – Conseil 6452,100 a church had 
a monument on its lawn expressing the view that abortion is morally 
wrong. The plaintiff objected to the memorial and sought redress, 
arguing that the inscription was “discriminatory because it denounces, 
victimizes, and excludes women”.101 The tribunal rejected the claim 
on the grounds that the monument was itself on church property and 
the inscription was “clearly an expression of religious belief”.102 The 
                                                                                                                       
100 [2011] O.H.R.T.D. No. 650, 2011 HRTO 639 (Ont. H.R.T.). The inscription on the 
monument read as follows: “Let us pray that all life rests in the hands of God from conception until 
natural death” [translation]. 
101 Id., at para. 3. 
102 Id., at para. 36. In the end, the tribunal avoided the conflict entirely by holding that 
“the manifestation of religious belief in an inscription displayed on church property is not a 
‘service’ or ‘facility’” covered by s. 1 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990,  
c. H.19. 
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church was entitled to use its property to advance its religious agenda. 
In effect, the property claim was a proxy for the religion claim with 
the result that the property right was superior because it was closely 
related to the core mission of the religious organization.103 Similarly, 
in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of “compulsory use of sacred places” for the celebration of 
same-sex marriages and concluded that the property rights of the 
religious institution would trump equality concerns.104 This particular 
balancing makes sense because, after all, it is hard to imagine an 
activity closer to the core of religious belief than the celebration of 
religious rites in a religious building.105 
The other end of the spectrum is represented by cases in which 
private parties engage in commercial activity that has a more 
attenuated connection with religious activity. Thus in Robertson v. 
Goertzen, a human rights tribunal in the Northwest Territories 
sanctioned a landlord who refused to rent an apartment to two gay 
men.106 The landlord claimed that his religious beliefs prevented him 
from condoning homosexuality by renting to a same-sex couple, and 
asserted that being forced to rent to the complainants would impose an 
undue hardship on him because he feared “[God’s] judgment at 
death”.107 The tribunal accepted the sincerity of the landlord’s religious 
belief, but balanced those beliefs against the legislature’s intention “to 
ensure certain protected individuals and groups, including those who 
have a sexual orientation different than some other people, are not to 
                                                                                                                       
103 To be sure, although the plaintiff attempted to state a discrimination claim, she 
could not establish a denial of a service or facility within the terms of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. The crux of her claim was that she was offended by the 
message. 
104 [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 59 (S.C.C.). To be sure, the 
primary issue before the Court was whether religious officials might be required to perform 
same-sex marriages. However, the Court also dealt with the property question (also at para. 59): 
The question we are asked to answer is confined to the performance of same-sex 
marriages by religious officials. However, concerns were raised about the compulsory 
use of sacred places for the celebration of such marriages and about being compelled to 
otherwise assist in the celebration of same-sex marriages. The reasoning that leads us to 
conclude that the guarantee of freedom of religion protects against the compulsory 
celebration of same-sex marriages, suggests that the same would hold for these concerns 
(emphasis added).  
105 See, e.g., Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] O.J. No. 2714, 60 O.R. (3d) 321 
(Ont. Div. Ct.), affd Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 2268, 65 O.R. (3d) 161 
(Ont. C.A.). 
106 [2012] A.W.L.D. 375 (N.W.T. Human Rights Adjudication Panel). 
107 Id., at para. 24. 
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be harmed by the exercise of religious freedom”.108 The fact that the 
property in question was residential real estate offered to the public 
without any connection to a core religious function convinced the 
tribunal that the landlord’s property claim had to be subordinated to 
the plaintiff’s equality right. 
A similar situation arose in Eadie v. Riverbend Bed and Breakfast, 
wherein the owners of a B&B refused to rent a room to a same-sex 
couple.109 The owners were devout Christians who wanted to use the 
guest house as a “ministry” and often sought to discuss their religious 
values with guests if any were open to such a discussion.110 They also 
argued that their business was different from a hotel in that it was 
operated inside their home. As a result, requiring them to rent to a same-
sex couple would force them to violate their sincerely held religious 
beliefs by “permitting behaviour in their home which they believe on 
religious grounds to be prohibited”.111 
The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal rejected this defence, 
holding that the activity in question fell closer to the commercial end 
of the religion/property spectrum. It laid great emphasis on the fact 
that the B&B was not operated by a church or religious organization. 
While it recognized that “the business was operated by individuals 
with sincere religious beliefs respecting same-sex couples, and out of a 
portion of their personal residence, it was still a commercial activity. It 
was the [owners’] personal and voluntary choice to start up a business 
in their personal residence” and, thus, they were not compelled by the 
state to act in a manner inconsistent with their religious views.112 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hutterian Brethren,113 the 
tribunal noted that this was one occasion “when the exercise of 
personal religious beliefs in the public sphere may be limited or carry 
a cost”.114 Having entered into the commercial sphere, the B&B’s 
owners were engaged in a purely commercial activity, unconnected 
with any religious organization and offered to the public at large, and 
                                                                                                                       
108 Id., at para. 45. 
109 [2012] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 247, 2012 BCHRT 247 (B.C.H.R.T.). 
110 Id., at para. 20. 
111 Id., at para. 94. 
112 Id., at para. 165. 
113 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567 (S.C.C.). 
114 Eadie v. Riverbend Bed and Breakfast, [2012] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 247, 2012 BCHRT 247, 
at para. 168 (B.C.H.R.T.). 
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thus had the obligation to provide services to the public regardless of 
their personal religious beliefs. 
Cases in the middle of the spectrum have proven rather more difficult 
to resolve, as these often involve a combination of economic activity and 
the assertion of a dignity (usually religion) right. Frequently, they involve 
a claim by one party seeking to use its property in a manner that is not 
purely commercial but which is closely connected to a religious practice 
or belief. 
Without doubt, the most well-known of these is Syndicat Northcrest 
v. Amselem,115 wherein the Supreme Court held that a Jewish resident 
of a condominium building could erect a “sukkah” on his balcony in 
spite of the fact that the contract between him and the other 
condominium owners prohibited such a structure.116 The Court rejected 
the condominium’s contract claim on the grounds that interference 
with the other owners’ property rights would be “minimal” or 
“trivial”.117 
Amselem is most often cited for the manner in which it refined the 
concept of freedom of religion under the Charter. Yet, at bottom, the case 
really involved a clash between the property rights of two private 
parties.118 On the one side was a property owner (Amselem) who sought 
to use his property to exercise his religious beliefs, while on the other 
was a group of competing owners (Syndicat Northcrest) who wanted to 
enforce the terms of the contract between them and Amselem. In 
resolving the case, the Court adopted a rather simplistic balancing test, 
weighing the benefits and burdens that would be imposed on either party 
in the event of a decree in favour of the other. It placed on the one side 
                                                                                                                       
115 [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, at para. 54, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.). 
116 A “sukkah” is a temporary dwelling built by Jewish people as part of the celebration of 
the festival of Sukkot. The structure is meant to remind the believers of the shelter that God provided 
for them during their time in the desert. It is usually built of material that allows the roof to be open 
to the sky. Most of a family’s daily activities, such as eating or sleeping, take place in the sukkah 
during the festival period. Abraham P. Bloch, The Biblical and Historical Background of Jewish 
Customs and Ceremonies (Ktav, 1980), at 186-91. 
117 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at paras. 85-86 
(S.C.C.). 
118 It is important to note at the outset that Amselem does not itself involve a claim brought 
under the Charter. Instead, the case was brought under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 ( “Quebec Charter”) because there was no state action. Unlike its federal 
counterpart, the Quebec Charter applies to both public and private action: Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 467, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 38 (S.C.C.). 
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Amselem’s right to use his property to exercise his religious beliefs.119 
On the other side was the condominium’s interest in protecting the 
aesthetics of the property as well as the safety and security of other 
residents. With respect to the latter, Syndicat Northcrest asserted that the 
balconies of the building served as emergency escape routes, and thus the 
building of structures on them had the potential to create a safety hazard 
in the event of fire. 
The majority rejected the safety argument on the grounds that 
Amselem had promised that any structure he erected would not block the 
exits.120 This was the case even though the condominium presented a 
letter from its insurer in which the company declared that it would not 
cover any loss arising from the construction of structures on balconies.121 
With the safety argument discarded, it seems clear that the majority 
regarded the case as merely requiring a balance between the religious 
right and the preservation of the building’s aesthetic features. Framing 
the interests in this way allowed the Court to diminish the negative 
impact of Amselem’s sukkah on the other owners’ property interest. To 
be sure, although the Court recognized that “[c]onduct which would 
potentially cause harm to or interference with the rights of others would 
not automatically be protected”,122 it minimized the condominium’s 
concerns about aesthetics on the grounds that “the alleged intrusions or 
deleterious effects” were “at best, minimal” or “quite trivial”.123 With 
that assessment of the interests, the Court easily concluded that the 
condominium’s property right must yield: 
In a multiethnic and multicultural country such as ours, which 
accentuates and advertises its modern record of respecting cultural 
diversity and human rights and of promoting tolerance of religious and 
ethnic minorities — and is in many ways an example thereof for other  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
119 In considering the spectrum, it should be noted that Amselem’s claim is not akin to that 
of the church in Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb – Conseil 6452, [2011] O.H.R.T.D. No. 650, 
2011 HRTO 639 (Ont. H.R.T.), for the obvious reason that his is secular property. On the other 
hand, he is not similar to the B&B in Eadie v. Riverbend Bed and Breakfast, [2012] B.C.H.R.T.D. 
No. 247, 2012 BCHRT 247 (B.C.H.R.T.) because he was not using the property for commercial 
purposes. 
120 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 89 
(S.C.C.). 
121 Id., at para. 171. 
122 Id., at para. 62. 
123 Id., at paras. 84 and 86. 
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societies —, the argument of the respondent that nominal, minimally 
intruded-upon aesthetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the 
appellants’ religious freedom is unacceptable.124 
Writing in dissent, Bastarache J. criticized the majority and asserted 
that it used the wrong balancing test. In his view, simply considering the 
balance of convenience between the parties, as was done by the majority, 
violates both the letter and spirit of the Quebec Charter, which requires 
not only a consideration of the individual interests involved, but the 
common interest of all citizens of Quebec as well.125 In Amselem’s case, 
that meant that the Court should account for the fact that not only the co-
owners, but also the citizens of Quebec, have “the right to expect 
contracts will be respected”.126  
In considering these expanded interests, Bastarache J. noted that the 
insurers’ withdrawal of coverage for any loss attributable to a structure 
on a balcony was, in fact, a significant infringement on the 
condominium’s property rights. As for the aesthetic claim, Bastarache J. 
asserted that the co-owners’ right to preserve the value of their 
investment in the property was entitled to as much protection under the 
Quebec Charter as Amselem’s religious right.127 With that in mind, 
Amselem’s right to freedom of religion could not be exercised in 
harmony with the rights and freedoms of other owners of Syndicat 
Northcrest or the Quebec public. 
Justice Binnie made the same point even more directly in his dissent:  
There is a vast difference, it seems to me, between using freedom of 
religion as a shield against interference with religious freedom by the 
State and as a sword against co-contractors in a private building. It was 
for the appellants, not the other co-owners, to determine in advance of 
their unit purchase what the appellants’ particular religious beliefs 
required. They had a choice of buildings in which to invest. They 
                                                                                                                       
124 Id., at para. 87. 
125 Id., at para. 154, per Bastarache J. (dissenting), quoting Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa 
Inc., [1998] S.C.J. No. 30, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591, at para. 56 (S.C.C.). Section 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12  provides as follows: 
In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper 
regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of 
Québec. 
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be 
fixed by law.  
126 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 172 
(S.C.C.). 
127 Id., at paras. 165-167. 
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undertook by contract to the owners of this building to abide by the 
rules of this building even (as is apparently the case) they accepted the 
rules without reading them.128 
Nevertheless, although the Amselem majority purported to use a 
balancing test, it is not clear what factors went into the balance. The 
Court simply declared that the burden on the property claim arising from 
the building of a sukkah on Amselem’s balcony would be trivial, without 
explaining how it came to that conclusion. This lack of detail 
demonstrates the arbitrariness of the balancing process. The majority’s 
curt dismissal of the safety concern in the face of the insurers’ objection 
implies the use of a results-driven approach. The fact that the Court 
preferred to accept Amselem’s bare promise not to block the exits over 
the condominium’s legitimate concerns that it would essentially be 
uninsured for the entire period during which Amselem’s sukkah was on 
the balcony is simply inexplicable.  
Thus, although the Court might be seen to have solved the particular 
case before it, it did not set forth any test or standard by which conflicts 
between property and dignity rights might be resolved more generally. 
Instead, it limited itself to resolving the dispute between the particular 
parties then before it. One might conclude from this that the test is 
simply one of balancing “salutary” and “deleterious” effects, with the 
result that if the burden on property rights exceeded that placed on the 
religious right, the conclusion might have been different. Moreover, as 
noted by Bastarache J., the end result of the balancing test simply 
depends on what factors a court decides to throw into the mix. According 
to Bastarache J., failing to consider the security concerns allowed the 
majority to conclude that the burden on the other owners’ property rights 
was “trivial”. Had the majority taken the insurers’ letter more seriously, 
then the balance could quite easily be struck differently. In short, the 
balancing test utilized in Amselem was largely instrumentalist in both 
approach and effect.  
Other cases involve more direct clashes between a property right that 
serves as a proxy for religion and the equality rights of third parties. An 
example is found in Brockie v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 
wherein an Ontario court held that a printer’s right to freedom of contract 
did not extend to refusing to print business cards for the director of an 
LGBTQ advocacy group.129 The printer, a devout Christian who believed 
                                                                                                                       
128 Id., at para. 185, per Binnie J. (dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
129 [2002] O.J. No. 2375, 222 D.L.R. (4th) 174 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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that homosexuality was a sin, claimed that providing the service would 
infringe on his religious beliefs. The Ontario Board of Inquiry (the 
precursor to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal) held that Brockie 
“remains free to hold his religious beliefs and to practice them in his 
home, and in his Christian community”.130 However, “[w]hat he is not 
free to do, when he enters the public marketplace and offers services to 
the public in Ontario, is to practice those beliefs in a manner that 
discriminates against lesbians and gays by denying them a service 
available to everyone else.”131 The Board then ordered Brockie to 
provide services to lesbians and gays to the same extent they are 
provided to others. 
On appeal, the Superior Court modified the tribunal’s blanket order in 
an effort to balance the religious and equality rights at issue. The court 
recognized the existence of a “conflict of dignities” requiring a balance 
between individual religious rights and the right to be free of 
discrimination in the marketplace.132 Thus, in weighing the benefits and 
burdens, the court held that the “further the activity is from the core 
elements of the freedom, the more likely the activity is to impact on 
others and the less deserving the activity is of protection”.133 
Consequently, “[s]ervice of the public in a commercial service must be 
considered at the periphery of activities protected by freedom of 
religion.”134 The court ultimately rejected the idea that the printer’s 
religious rights were implicated to any great extent in the wider 
commercial marketplace, concluding instead that the printer’s claim of a 
right to freedom of religion was “at best, at the fringes of that right”.135 
Accordingly, limiting Brockie’s freedom to act on his religious beliefs 
was appropriate in order to prevent widespread discrimination in 
obtaining commercial services based on sexual orientation. With that 
said, however, the court modified the tribunal’s broad order in a way 
designed to protect Brockie’s religious rights when a printing job came 
closer to the core of his religious belief, decreeing that Brockie might, in 
fact, have the right to reject a printing job when it was designed to 
                                                                                                                       
130 Brillinger v. Brockie, [2000] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 3, at para. 47 (O.B.I.). 
131 Id., at para. 48. 
132 Brockie v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2002] O.J. No. 2375, at para. 20, 222 
D.L.R. (4th) 174 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
133 Id., at para. 51. 
134 Id. 
135 Id., at para. 54. 
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promote the “gay and lesbian lifestyle”. The court used a hypothetical to 
explain its reasoning: 
If any particular printing project ordered by Mr. Brockie (or any gay or 
lesbian person, or organization/entity comprising gay or lesbian 
persons) contained material that conveyed a message proselytizing and 
promoting the gay and lesbian lifestyle or ridiculed his religious beliefs, 
such material might reasonably be held to be in direct conflict with the 
core elements of Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs. On the other hand, if 
the particular printing object contained a directory of goods and 
services that might be of interest to the gay and lesbian community, that 
material might reasonably be held not to be in direct conflict with the 
core elements of Mr. Brockie’s religious beliefs.136 
The balancing test employed in Brockie is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it implies that religious people can compartmentalize their 
lives into neat categories, one involving their private life and the other 
involving their activities in public. The decision requires that Brockie 
and others who enter into the “public marketplace” subordinate whatever 
private religious scruples they have when those principles conflict with 
larger public policy goals, which in this case include the need to prevent 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Some might argue that this 
injunction violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Dickson C.J.C.’s famous 
statement in Big M that every individual must be free “to hold and to 
manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates, 
provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not injure his or her 
neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and 
opinions of their own”.137 Of course, the Ontario court concluded that, on 
balance, allowing Brockie to refuse to print the requested material 
worked an injury to the parallel rights of the plaintiff. 
The other, and perhaps more troubling, issue is the court’s willingness 
to determine what activities are at the core of a person’s religious beliefs. 
To be sure, Brockie pre-dates Amselem by two years and, therefore, the 
Ontario court could be excused for not having had the benefit of 
considering the Supreme Court’s later admonition that “courts should 
avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of religious 
                                                                                                                       
136 Id., at para. 56. 
137 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 123 
(S.C.C.). 
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requirement, ‘obligation’, precept, ‘commandment’, custom or ritual”.138 
Nonetheless, if taken seriously, Brockie opens the door to a balancing 
exercise every bit as instrumentalist as that in Amselem. After all, in 
determining that Brockie’s economic activity was not inextricably 
connected to his Christian faith, the Ontario court was able to conclude 
that the equality right prevails. In Amselem, on the other hand, the 
Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the 
importance of Amselem’s use of his property. In that case, the Supreme 
Court determined that the use of the balcony as contemplated by its 
owner was an essential aspect of his religious practice. Seen together, 
therefore, the cases demonstrate that how a court determines the core of 
religious belief ultimately determines the outcome. 
This can be seen even more clearly in Smith v. Knights of 
Columbus,139 wherein the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal considered the 
case of a same-sex couple denied the right to use a hall owned by a group 
affiliated with the Catholic Church for a wedding. The owner asserted 
that its refusal was motivated by deeply held religious beliefs and thus its 
actions were justified under both the Charter and the B.C. Human Rights 
Code.140 Following Brockie, the tribunal began its analysis with the 
assertion that “the further the act at issue is from the core religious belief 
of the person denying the service, the less likely the act will be found to 
be justified”.141 The tribunal then engaged in a spectrum analysis wherein 
it noted that had the couple in question sought to rent the parish church 
for the wedding, the church would have been entitled to reject the 
request. On the other hand, the situation would have been different if the 
couple had sought to rent “commercial space, which was available for 
rent to the public and which had no religious affiliation”.142 In this latter 
case, the owners of the hall would not have been permitted to refuse.143 
                                                                                                                       
138 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 50 
(S.C.C.). But see Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 710, at para. 19 (S.C.C.): 
Religion is an integral aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at the boardroom door. 
What secularism does rule out, however, is any attempt to use the religious views of one 
part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the 
community. ... Religious views that deny equal recognition and respect to the members of 
a minority group cannot be used to exclude the concerns of the minority group. 
139 [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 544, 2005 BCHRT 544 (B.C.H.R.T.). 
140 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210. 
141 Smith v. Knights of Columbus, [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 544, 2005 BCHRT 544, at para. 106 
(B.C.H.R.T.). 
142 Id., at para. 110. 
143 Id., at paras. 108-110. 
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The Knights of Columbus presented a case that lay “at neither end of 
the spectrum, but somewhere along the continuum, [and thereby] 
requiring a delicate balance”.144 The hall in question was on church land, 
but the Knights had made it available to the public without regard to 
religious affiliation. When first approached by the complainants, the 
Knights appeared not to realize that the reception was for a same-sex 
wedding.145 
The tribunal was thus forced to consider whether the hall, as operated by 
the Knights, was a public accommodation within the meaning of the 
Human Rights Code.146 If so, then arguably the Knights’ decision to refuse 
its use for a same-sex reception constituted discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. In considering the question, the tribunal examined the 
policies and practices of the Knights with respect to rentals. It concluded 
that while the hall was used for a variety of both religious and secular 
activities, the Knights’ policy (although unwritten) was that the hall could 
not have been used for a purpose contrary to the tenets of the Catholic 
faith.147 Under these circumstances, the tribunal eventually agreed that the 
Knights did not have to rent the hall for activities that would be contrary to 
their core religious beliefs, thus upholding the Knights’ claim in theory at 
least. The panel found that although the Knights were not being asked to 
participate in the solemnization of the marriage, renting the hall for the 
wedding reception would have required them to “indirectly condone the 
celebration of a same-sex marriage, an act that is contrary to their core 
religious beliefs”.148 
                                                                                                                       
144 Id., at para. 112. 
145 Id., at paras. 24-26, 33. 
146 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 8. 
147 Smith v. Knights of Columbus, [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 544, 2005 BCHRT 544, at para. 112 
(B.C.H.R.T.). The tribunal noted that the Knights’ policy of not renting to same-sex couples was not 
firmly established or written down at the time of the incident. However, it allowed the Knights to 
rely on the policy ex ante and conceded that “[i]t is not unusual for a standard not to be articulated 
until the issue presents itself”: id., at para. 57. 
148 Id., at para. 113. It is important to note, however, that the tribunal ultimately ordered the 
Knights to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The tribunal concluded that while the owners could not 
have been forced to rent the hall, they still had an obligation to take steps to accommodate the 
renters, where that could be done without violating their religious convictions. In this case, the 
tribunal concluded that the manner and timing of the cancellation was inconsistent with that duty. 
Id., at para. 120. Using an accommodation analysis, the tribunal noted, id., at para. 122, that the 
Knights originally agreed to rent the hall, but then cancelled shortly before the wedding. Although 
the plaintiffs were able to secure an alternate venue, the tribunal found that the manner of 
cancellation imposed a hardship on the couple: 
Although, in this case, the Knights could not offer the complainants access to the 
Hall, and the Panel does not find that they were required to find another Hall for the 
complainants, they were required to consider the effect on the complainants and any 
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When it comes to property, therefore, the cases indicate that dignity 
rights, such as religious or equality rights, are almost always given 
priority over pure common law contract and property rights. The 
exception is where the activity or service in question is itself closely 
associated with a dignity right. The question in these cases, then, is 
always one of where on the point of the spectrum of economic activity 
the particular transaction lies. Economic activity closer to the core of 
religious belief brings greater protection, while the exercise of garden-
variety property or economic rights with only a tangential connection to 
a dignity right will yield. In the end, therefore, “the further the activity is 
from the core religious belief of the individual, the less deserving it will 
be of constitutional protection”.149 
2. Speech versus Religion and Equity Rights 
Freedom of expression occupies a higher plane than property rights 
but it too can be limited by religion or equality claims. Indeed, it seems 
clear that religion and equality rights generally take precedence over 
speech except where the speech at issue is (1) closely connected to the 
core values of “political speech”; or (2) expressive speech closely related 
to another core Charter value.  
Political speech has long been thought to be “a necessary feature of 
modern democracy”,150 and the Supreme Court has declared that the 
“right of free expression of opinion and of criticism, upon matters of 
public policy and public administration, and the right to discuss and 
debate such matters, whether they be social, economic or political, are 
essential to the working of a parliamentary democracy”.151 As a result, 
when it comes to “pure speech” on matters of politics and public policy, 
expressive rights are nigh absolute. 
                                                                                                                       
possible steps they could have taken before calling the complainants and advising 
them that the Hall was no longer available, given they had entered into a contract to 
this effect. 
But see Dallaire v. Les Chevaliers de Colomb - Conseil 6452, [2011] O.H.R.T.D. No. 650, 2011 
HRTO 639, at para. 38 (Ont. H.R.T.) (asserting that the BCHRT rejected the Knights’ claimed right 
to refuse to rent). 
149 Smith v. Knights of Columbus, [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 544, 2005 BCHRT 544, at para. 117 
(B.C.H.R.T.). 
150 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 583 (S.C.C.). 
151 Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 326 (S.C.C.). 
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The same holds true where the speech is “expressive” in nature and is 
connected with another Charter value. Expressive speech, such as 
religious practice, artistic endeavour152 or even union picketing,153 
receives protection because it is the means by which other Charter rights 
are exercised. Thus, the performance of religious rites, preaching or 
teaching receive protection because these activities are the means by 
which the right to hold religious opinions are expressed. As the Court 
noted in Big M, “[t]he essence of the concept of freedom of religion is 
the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right 
to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice 
or by teaching and dissemination.”154 Religious practice is protected 
under the speech guarantee for the simple reason that the right to hold 
religious opinions would be a nullity if it did not include the right to 
express them.155 Similarly, artistic performances are protected because art 
is a form of language and “is in many ways an expression of cultural 
identity”, as well as “one’s identity with a particular set of thoughts, 
beliefs, opinions and emotions”.156 For its part, peaceful picketing is 
expressive of associational rights because it is a “crucial form” of 
collective action in the arena of labour relations, designed “to publicize 
the labour dispute in which the striking workers are embroiled and to 
mount a show of solidarity of the workers to their goal”.157 Courts and 
                                                                                                                       
152 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 
at para. 42 (S.C.C.) (“The content of expression can be conveyed through an infinite variety of forms 
of expression: for example, the written or spoken word, the arts, and even physical gestures or acts”). 
153 See, e.g., British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, at 244 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
573, at 586 (S.C.C.). 
154 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 94 
(S.C.C.). 
155 But see Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 36 (S.C.C.) (“The freedom to hold [religious] beliefs is 
broader than the freedom to act on them”). 
156 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1182 (S.C.C.). See also Ismail v. British Columbia (Human Rights 
Tribunal), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 2013 BCSC 1079 (B.C.S.C.). 
157 British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). See also Harrison v. 
Carswell, [1975] S.C.J. No. 73, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200, at 219 (S.C.C.): 
Society has long since acknowledged that a public interest is served by permitting union 
members to bring economic pressure to bear upon their respective employers through 
peaceful picketing, but the right has been exercisable in some locations and not in others …. 
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tribunals thus place a high value on protecting expressive activity as it 
relates to other Charter values.158 
Nevertheless, speech rights can be curtailed where they conflict with 
religion and equality values. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. 
Taylor159 and R. v. Keegstra160 establish the principle that speech might 
be restricted where it tends to arouse racial or religious hatred against 
others. Both these cases are really equality cases, and they stand for the 
proposition that limits on speech may be necessary to protect minority 
groups from oppression or discrimination. As with economic activity, 
however, the closer expression comes to religious practice, restricting 
expression becomes more problematic. Using a spectrum analysis, 
therefore, courts and tribunals have been able to distinguish between 
speech that is protected, even though it offends the dignity of others, 
from unprotected or hateful speech that is subject to suppression. 
The spectrum in speech cases is rather broad. At one end are the cases 
where speech is protected notwithstanding its impact on the dignity of 
others because it is closely connected to the essence of a Charter value. 
Thus, “pure” political speech or religious activity are protected even 
though the speech is upsetting or insulting to minority groups.161 The 
other end of the spectrum is represented by cases in which speech is 
curtailed because its purpose is to incite violence or stir up hatred toward 
others. These cases generally involve some form of “hate speech” and, 
indeed, implicate a form of expression that may not necessarily be 
considered speech at all. 
The former is represented by Tesseris v. Greek Orthodox Church of 
Canada.162 Here, a priest was accused of making disparaging comments 
about homosexual conduct. The tribunal rejected the claim on the 
grounds that “[t]eaching, dissemination and religious practice by clergy 
is clearly at the heart” of freedom of religion. The complainant 
“approached the priest, in the course of performing a religious rite ... to 
                                                                                                                       
158 Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at paras. 47-50 
(S.C.C.). See also Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial 
Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, at para. 32 (S.C.C.) (“It is through 
their expressive activities that unions are able to articulate and promote their common interests, and, 
in the event of a labour dispute, to attempt to persuade the employer”). 
159 [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.). 
160 [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
161 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.). See also Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), [2006] S.J.  
No. 221, 2006 SKCA 41, at para. 53 (Sask. C.A.). 
162 [2011] O.H.R.T.D. No. 780, 2011 HRTO 775 (Ont. H.R.T.). 
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seek his assistance as a member of the Greek Orthodox clergy. In giving 
a response in accordance with his faith, the priest was exercising his 
rights at the core of his right to freedom of religion and that were purely 
connected with his religious role.”163 
The protection afforded purely political speech is represented by the 
cases involving newspapers. Courts and tribunals have generally found 
the content of newspapers, both in the selection of the news articles and 
editorial opinion, to be at the heart of the right to free expression. The 
law has thus “recognized the freedom of the press to propagate its views 
and ideas on any issue and to select the material which it publishes”.164 
The press also has the right to refuse to publish material that runs 
contrary to the views it expresses.165 Put simply, editorial opinion is “at 
the very core” of the right to free expression, with the result, that, short 
of the kind of hate speech discussed below, equality claims are generally 
subordinated to the expressive rights of newspapers.166 
The other end of the spectrum is represented by the hate speech cases. 
Violent expression and expression that threatens violence do not fall 
within the protected sphere even if they are designed to advance a 
religious or political agenda.167 Thus, statutes outlawing speech 
advocating support for terrorism are valid.168 This is because threats of 
violence “take away free choice and undermine freedom of action” and 
“undermine the very values and social conditions that are necessary for 
the continued existence of freedom of expression”.169 Similarly, speech 
                                                                                                                       
163 Id., at para. 9. 
164 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] S.C.J. No. 55, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 
435, at 455 (S.C.C.). It should be noted that this case was decided under the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
S.C. 1960, c. 44, rather than the Charter. 
165 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] S.C.J. No. 55, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 
435, at 455 (S.C.C.). 
166 Owens v. Post Media Network Inc. (c.o.b. The Leader-Post), [2016] S.J. No. 509, 2016 
SKQB 289 (Sask. Q.B.); Whiteley v. Osprey Media Publishing Inc., [2010] O.H.R.T.D. No. 2154, 
2010 HRTO 2152 (Ont. H.R.T.). Most cases dealing with discrimination claims against newspapers 
have resulted in the tribunal finding that newspapers are not “services” or “facilities” for purposes of 
human rights codes. See, e.g., Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] S.C.J. No. 55, 
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 435, at 455 (S.C.C.); Whiteley v. Osprey Media Publishing Inc., [2010] O.H.R.T.D. 
No. 2154, 2010 HRTO 2152 (Ont. H.R.T.); Engineering Students’ Society, University of 
Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), [1989] S.J. No. 35, 10 C.H.R.R. 
D/5636 (Sask. C.A.); Warren v. Chapman, [1985] M.J. No. 117, 6 C.H.R.R. D/2777 (Man. C.A.). 
167 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 467, at para. 112 (S.C.C.). 
168 R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, at para. 70 (S.C.C.). 
169 Id. See also Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of 
Students — British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Immigration and Citizenship), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 
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designed to incite hatred against minority groups has also been limited 
on the grounds that “wilful promotion of hatred is an activity the form 
and consequences of which are analogous to those associated with 
violence or threats of violence”.170 In both situations — speech 
promoting violence and hate speech — courts limit such speech on the 
grounds that it has no redeeming social value.171 
The middle of the spectrum is represented by cases such as Ross and 
Whatcott. Here one finds that courts have been willing to restrict even 
religious expression on grounds similar to those in Taylor and Keegstra. 
Thus, in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,172 the Supreme 
Court upheld the removal of a school teacher who disseminated  
anti-semitic beliefs in various publications outside of school time.173 The 
Court agreed that the speech in question was a manifestation of the 
teacher’s rather unique religious beliefs, but upheld his removal from  
the classroom on the grounds that the comments unduly interfered with 
his students’ right to be free from a hostile educational environment.  
In deciding the question of whether Ross’ speech might be limited, 
the Supreme Court noted that the “core values” of the right to free 
expression were threefold. These include “the search for political, artistic 
and scientific truth, the protection of individual autonomy and self-
development, and the promotion of public participation in the democratic 
process”.174 Set against this template, the Court concluded that Ross’ speech 
did not fall within any of the core values underlying the Charter’s speech 
guarantee. When read in context, Ross’ claims could not be considered a 
search for political truth since its purpose was to silence the views of those 
in the targeted minority.175 With respect to the protection of individual 
autonomy and self-development, Ross’ unsupported assertion of the 
existence of an international Jewish conspiracy was actually designed to 
                                                                                                                       
(S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 
S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 583 (S.C.C.). 
170 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 731 (S.C.C.). 
171 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 583 (S.C.C.). 
172 [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.). 
173 “The gist of the respondent’s message [was] that Jews are heading a ‘conspiracy’ or a 
‘great Satanic movement’ against Christians with a view to destroying the Christian faith and 
civilization”: Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 
825, at para. 58 (S.C.C.). 
174 Id., at para. 89, quoting RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 280 (S.C.C.). 
175 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 
825, at para. 91 (S.C.C.). 
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hinder the ability of Jewish people to develop a sense of self-identity and 
belonging.176 Finally, Ross’ goal was decidedly not to encourage 
participation in the democratic process. On the contrary, its purpose and 
effect was to impede meaningful participation in social and political 
decision-making by Jews, “an end wholly antithetical to the democratic 
process”.177 
As for the religion claim, the Court recognized that freedom of religion 
is not without limits such that “any religious belief that denigrates and 
defames the religious beliefs of others erodes the very basis of the 
guarantee in s. 2 (a) — a basis that guarantees that every individual is 
free to hold and to manifest the beliefs dictated by one’s conscience”.178 
While Ross certainly had a right to express his sincerely held religious 
beliefs, that right did not extend to denying others equal respect and 
dignity. 
Whatcott seems to be the apotheosis of this view.179 The speech in 
question was clearly motivated by religious belief, but the Court 
nonetheless held that it could be limited in order to reduce “the harmful 
effects and social costs of discrimination by tacking certain causes of 
discriminatory activity”.180 Again, the principle here seems to be that 
religious expression that denigrates other groups or treats members of 
vulnerable minority groups as somehow less worthy of dignity or respect 
than others is not entitled to the same degree of Charter protection as 
other exercises of expressive freedom. Where speech is concerned, 
therefore, limits on both political and religious speech are possible when 
necessary to protect equality values. Moreover, the cases decided thus far 
indicate that limits on speech may be imposed even when the speech 
goes very far down the spectrum towards sincere religious expression 
consistent with the theory, expressed by the Supreme Court in Big M 
Drug Mart, that protection is available only to such manifestations that 
do not injure one’s neighbours. 
Courts have taken a similar position where artistic expression is 
concerned. In two recent cases, tribunals have held that speech which 
offends someone’s dignity interest may be suppressed, at least where the 
speech prevents access to public accommodations. Thus, in Ismail v. 
                                                                                                                       
176 Id., at para. 92. 
177 Id., at para. 93. 
178 Id., at para. 94. 
179 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.). 
180 Id., at para. 71. 
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British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal),181 a comedian at a comedy 
club was ordered to pay damages to a member of the audience whom he 
had insulted on the basis of her sexual orientation.182 The language used 
by the comedian was offensive in the extreme and would likely have 
been considered beyond the pale in any other context. The claimant made 
an equality claim, alleging that the abuse constituted adverse treatment in 
the provision of a service customarily available to the public.183 For his 
part, the comedian argued that the restaurant at which the events took 
place was “an adult comedy club catering to a predominantly gay 
clientele”.184 He, therefore, asserted that derogatory jokes about 
homosexuals were well within the norm of a gay comedy club. 
The court noted that while comments made by comedians, artists and 
emcees are entitled to protection under section 2(b) of the Charter, there 
is no absolute protection for comments that might otherwise amount to 
discrimination under human rights legislation. It agreed that “comedy 
clubs are places where performers push boundaries and sometimes try to 
generate outrage”, but it does not necessarily follow that comedy clubs 
are “zones of absolute immunity from human rights legislation”.185 In the 
court’s view, the comments directed at the claimant were not part of  
the act, but were, in fact, designed to drive her from the premises. The 
speech in question could, therefore, be restricted since its purpose was to 
deny equal access to a service that was otherwise available to the general 
public.186 
A far more aggressive example of limiting speech where it offends 
dignity is found in Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de 
la jeunesse (Gabriel et autres) v. Ward.187 Although brought under the 
Quebec Charter of Rights,188 the case presents a similar factual situation 
to Ismail. Here, Ward, a local comedian, was ordered to pay damages to 
the plaintiff, whom he had ridiculed during his comedy act. The plaintiff, 
                                                                                                                       
181 [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 2013 BCSC 1079 (B.C.S.C.). 
182 The comments in question can be found in Ismail v. British Columbia (Human Rights 
Tribunal), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 2013 BCSC 1079, at paras. 66, 71 (B.C.S.C.). 
183 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 8. 
184 Ismail v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308, 2013 
BCSC 1079, at para. 312 (B.C.S.C.). 
185 Id., at para. 337. 
186 But see Redmond v. Hollywood Boutique, [2018] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 121, 2018 BCHRT 
121 (B.C.H.R.T.) (rejecting claim brought by a black woman against store playing rap music using 
racial slurs). 
187 [2016] Q.H.R.T.J. no 18, 2016 QCTDP 18 (Que. H.R.T.). 
188 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, ss. 4, 10 (the “Quebec 
Charter”). 
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a young man with a physical disability, had achieved a certain fame as a 
singer in Quebec, appearing on television and even presenting the 
national anthem at a Montréal Canadiens game. Relying on sections 4 
and 10 of the Quebec Charter,189 the plaintiff contended that the 
comedian’s jokes infringed his right to dignity and reputation. The 
comedian, of course, argued that his comments were protected speech.  
The court admitted that both parties were “public personalities”190 and 
that the plaintiff suffered no actual damage to his career or any other 
financial or property interest. Nonetheless, the court rejected the free 
expression claim on the grounds that the comments injured the plaintiff’s 
“honour, reputation, and dignity”: 
Comments that are unacceptable in private do not automatically 
become lawful when uttered by a comedian in public. What is more, 
having a platform imposes certain responsibilities. Comedians may not 
base their actions solely on the laughter of their audience; they must 
also take into account the fundamental rights of the victims of their 
jokes.  
The fact that Ward’s comments have an artistic aspect is no more able 
to shield Ward from legal actions than the fact that they are comedy. 
Freedom of expression includes freedom of artistic expression, but the 
latter does not enjoy a status superior than general freedom of 
expression. Freedom of artistic expression is also circumscribed by the 
other rights protected by the [Quebec] Charter.191 
To be sure, the case turns on Quebec’s rather idiosyncratic definition 
of “discrimination”, which is far broader than the concept at common 
law and in human rights statutes elsewhere. One of the fundamental 
guarantees of the Quebec Charter is that “[e]very person has a right to 
the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation”.192 It also provides 
                                                                                                                       
189 See, id.: 
4. Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation. 
..... 
10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human 
rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, 
sex, gender identity or expression, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except 
as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, 
social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.  
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing such right.  
190 Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Gabriel et autres) v. 
Ward, [2016] Q.H.R.T.J. no 18, 2016 QCTDP 18, at para. 131 (Que. H.R.T.). 
191 Id., at paras. 134-135. 
192 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, s. 4. 
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that a person has a right to “full and equal recognition and exercise of his 
human rights” without distinction, exclusion or preference based on a 
prohibited ground of discrimination, one of which is “a handicap or the 
use of any means to palliate a handicap”.193 Discrimination under the 
Quebec Charter thus exists where a private party or government body 
uses a distinction, exclusion or preference in such a way as to nullify or 
impair the rights guaranteed in the Charter, which in this case, was the 
right to dignity, honour and reputation.194 The Quebec Human Rights 
Tribunal found that by exposing the plaintiff to mockery because of his 
physical appearance caused by his disability, Ward infringed on the 
plaintiff’s right to respect for his reputation in a manner that was 
discriminatory as defined by the Quebec Charter.195 
The result in Ward appears to conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
approach to this issue since the latter has consistently rejected the idea 
that mere insults can rise to the level of speech that must be curtailed. 
Indeed, the Court has made it clear that “[e]xpression criticizing or 
creating humour at the expense of others can be derogatory to the extent 
of being repugnant”, and that “[r]epresentations belittling a minority 
group or attacking its dignity through jokes, ridicule or insults may be 
hurtful and offensive”.196 However, “offensive ideas are not sufficient to 
ground a justification for infringing on freedom of expression”.197 
Notwithstanding this admonition, we see in Ward a greater willingness to 
subordinate speech rights to dignity claims, even where there is no 
measurable injury.  
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court’s approval of 
restrictions on hate speech distinguishes “between the expression of 
repugnant ideas” and “expression which exposes groups to hatred”.198 
The latter form of speech is subject to limitation, while the former is not. 
This distinction “filters out expression which, while repugnant and 
                                                                                                                       
193 Id., s. 10. 
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195 The case is currently on appeal before the Quebec Court of Appeal: Ward c. Commission 
des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, No. 500-09-026283-168 (May 17, 2017). 
196 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 467, at para. 90 (S.C.C.). See also Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), 
[2006] S.J. No. 221, 2006 SKCA 41, at para. 53 (Sask. C.A.). 
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offensive, does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and 
rejection that risks causing discrimination or other harmful effects”.199  
In the end, it would appear that speech may be limited where it rises 
to the level of hate speech in that it is calculated to incite imminent harm 
or expose a group to hatred or contempt. Quebec, however, adds an 
additional dimension to limitations on speech with its insistence on 
protecting an individual’s right to dignity. 
3. Religion and Equality Rights 
The Supreme Court continues to assert that “there is no hierarchy 
amongst constitutional provisions, and equality guarantees cannot 
therefore be used to invalidate other rights expressly conferred by the 
Constitution”.200 More specifically, the Court has declared that any 
“attempt to give equality guarantees a superior status in a ‘hierarchy’ of 
rights must be rejected”.201 
In spite of these assertions, however, it is quite clear that a new 
hierarchy of rights has emerged and that “equality” is, in fact, at the top of 
the pyramid. A significant demonstration of this hierarchy is found in 
Bruker v. Marcovitz.202 Here, the Supreme Court was faced with a 
settlement agreement in a divorce between an orthodox Jewish couple. The 
agreement provided that the husband would obtain a “ghet”, or religious 
divorce, upon the conclusion of the civil proceedings. Without a religious 
divorce, the wife would not be able to remarry in the faith and any children 
subsequently born to her would be considered illegitimate.203 Moreover, 
under Jewish law, she was prevented from obtaining a ghet on her own. 
Only the husband of the marriage may seek a divorce from the rabbinical 
court. For nearly 15 years, Mr. Marcovitz refused to appear before the 
rabbinical court to obtain the ghet. Consequently, Ms. Bruker sued for 
breach of contract. In awarding damages against the husband, the trial 
court expressed its concern that the husband’s refusal deprived the wife of 
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an equal right to remarry because, as a woman, she could not obtain the 
religious divorce on her own.204 
The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which had to consider (1) whether the agreement to obtain a religious 
divorce was an obligation cognizable under Quebec law and (2) if so, 
whether enforcement of such an agreement would violate Mr. Marcovitz’s 
freedom of religion. The Court answered the first question in the 
affirmative, asserting that “[t]he fact that a dispute has a religious aspect 
does not by itself make it non-justiciable”.205 Thus, “while the courts may 
not intervene in strictly doctrinal or spiritual matters, they will when civil 
or property rights are engaged”.206 Writing for the majority, Abella J. held 
that the fact that a contractual agreement has religious elements does not 
immunize it from judicial scrutiny. In her view, the plaintiff’s claim did not 
require the court to adjudicate doctrinal religious principles, such as 
whether a particular ghet was, in fact, valid. On the contrary,  
Mr. Marcovitz’s promise was simply to remove religious barriers to 
remarriage by going to the rabbinical court and obtaining a decree of 
divorce. The contract was valid because it was negotiated between two 
consenting adults, each of whom was represented by counsel, as part of a 
voluntary exchange of commitments intended to have legally enforceable 
consequences. Under those circumstances, the obligation was justiciable in 
the civil courts.207 Justice Abella also noted that although the civil law will 
not recognize the enforceability of moral obligations, “there is nothing in 
the Civil Code preventing someone from transforming his or her moral 
obligations into legally valid and binding ones”.208  
It is important to note, however, that Abella J.’s reasons for enforcing 
Marcovitz’s obligation to go to the rabbinical court and obtain a ghet was 
not merely based on the contract made between him and his ex-wife. For 
Abella J., the husband was obligated to grant his wife a religious divorce 
on public policy grounds. Justice Abella noted that the refusal of Jewish 
husbands to freely give their wives a ghet was, “a long-standing source 
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of concern and frustration in Jewish communities”.209 This concern led to 
amendments to the Divorce Act giving a court discretionary authority to 
prevent a spouse from obtaining relief under that Act if that spouse 
refused to remove a barrier to religious marriage.210 In Abella J.’s view, 
these amendments are “a clear indication that it is public policy in this 
country that such barriers are to be discouraged”.211 Moreover, because 
the amendments “received overwhelming support from the Jewish 
community, including its more religious elements”,212 the state was 
justified in stepping in to ensure that marriage and divorce are available 
equally to men and women: 
The refusal of a husband to provide a get, therefore, arbitrarily denies 
his wife access to a remedy she independently has under Canadian law 
and denies her the ability to remarry and get on with her life in 
accordance with her religious beliefs.213 
When it came time to consider the husband’s religious freedom claim 
under the Quebec Charter, the majority employed the same section 9.1 
balancing test used in Amselem.214 This test requires that when balancing 
a claim of religious freedom, courts must have due regard for 
“democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the 
citizens of Québec”.215 In balancing the interests, Abella J. began by 
stating that Mr. Marcovitz had very “little to put on the scales”.216 She 
placed great emphasis on the fact that he “freely entered into a valid and 
binding contractual obligation and now seeks to have it set aside based 
on ex post facto religious compunctions”.217 She then asserted that the 
husband’s objections to obtaining the religious divorce were not the 
result of a sincerely held religious belief. On the contrary, she declared 
that “his refusal to provide the get was based less on religious conviction 
than on the fact that he was angry”.218 She then considered the public 
policy implications and concluded that “[t]he public interest in protecting 
equality rights, the dignity of Jewish women in their independent ability 
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to divorce and remarry, as well as the public benefit in enforcing valid 
and binding contractual obligations, are among the interests and values 
that outweigh Mr. Marcovitz’s claim”.219 
Marcovitz’s religious interest had to yield for two reasons. First, there 
was the “policy benefit of preventing individuals from avoiding the usual 
legal consequences of their contractual breaches”.220 Second, there was a 
“constitutionally and statutorily articulated commitment[] to equality, 
religious freedom and autonomous choice in marriage and divorce” that 
would flow from the breach of his legal obligation.221 The defendant’s 
continued refusal to grant his wife a religious divorce “represented an 
unjustified and severe impairment of her ability to live her life in 
accordance with this country’s values and her Jewish beliefs”.222 
Consequently, any infringement of Mr. Marcovitz’s freedom of religion 
was “inconsequential compared to the disproportionate disadvantaging 
effect on Ms. Bruker’s ability to live her life fully as a Jewish woman in 
Canada”.223 
The decision in Bruker seems to clearly contradict Amselem on a 
number of points. First, there is the question of the contract. In both 
cases, there is a secular agreement (in Amselem dealing with property, 
and in Bruker dealing with a divorce) set against a claim of religious 
rights. In Amselem, the Court held that enforcing the property contract 
would force the party to violate his religious beliefs. In Bruker, however, 
the contract required the husband to actually perform a religious act 
against his will. As the Quebec Court of Appeal noted, obtaining a ghet 
“is not simply a matter of ‘showing up’ and going through a meaningless 
ritual, especially for someone who is an Orthodox Jew. A religious 
intention is required. Indeed, divorcing by a formal written document is 
considered amongst the 613 mitzvot or commandments from the 
Torah.”224 As a result, in penalizing the husband for not obtaining the 
ghet, the Supreme Court actually punished a private citizen for not 
performing a religious rite. 
The Supreme Court minimized the issue of consent, regarding it as a 
mere formality. In actuality, however, an order requiring him to comply 
with his obligations under the contract would essentially have been an 
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order insisting that he lie to the rabbinical authorities. After all, if he had 
appeared before the rabbinical court, he would have been asked if he 
freely consented to the divorce. If he answered in the negative and said, 
“No, I’m only here because a judge made me come”, then arguably the 
rabbinical court would have refused the divorce and he would have been 
sanctioned for failing to do what he promised to do. As a result, the only 
way to have avoided being penalized was to lie to the rabbis. 
More importantly, the assertion that a Jewish husband’s refusal to 
grant a divorce interferes with his wife’s right to remarry under Canadian 
law is simply incorrect.225 As Deschamps J. noted in her dissent, the acts 
of rabbinical courts with regard to marriage have no effect in civil law.226 
The regulation of marriage and divorce is established by statute, and the 
decisions of religious authorities in these matters are of no consequence. 
Thus, the failure to obtain a religious divorce imposed no legal 
impediment to Bruker’s remarriage in Canada. Contrary to Abella J.’s 
assertions, therefore, women whose husbands refuse to obtain a ghet are 
not denied any right under Canadian law. What they are denied is a right 
to remarry in their faith, but arguably that is not a problem that is 
susceptible to judicial remedy.227 
Yet, the most surprising aspect of the decision in Bruker is the ease 
with which the Court takes upon itself the ability to determine the 
underlying doctrinal issues. Justice Abella’s assertion that Marcovitz did 
not offer sufficient religious reasons to support his objection seems to 
conflict with Amselem’s admonition that “it is inappropriate for courts 
rigorously to study and focus on the past practices of claimants in order 
to determine whether their current beliefs are sincerely held”.228 Far more 
troubling, however, is Abella J.’s willingness to interpret the tenets of 
Judaism on the question of consent in the process of obtaining a ghet.229 
Indeed, it is the majority’s assumptions about the theological issues that 
underlay the obligation that provided the basis for insisting that the 
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object of the contract was determinable by a civil court.230 This was one 
of Deschamps J.’s most significant objections. In her view, the contract 
to obtain a religious divorce was not a proper object of a contract 
because it was not an act capable of having legal consequence. In other 
words, for a contract to be valid under Quebec law, a civil court must 
have the ability to determine whether the requirements necessary to make 
the underlying obligation effective have been fulfilled.231 Put another 
way, for the contract between Bruker and Marcovitz to be justiciable, the 
Court must have been able to determine whether the underlying act was 
valid. The only way to determine that would be to resolve the theological 
issues concerning consent. Seen in this light, the majority’s reliance 
on contract as a means of enforcing the obligation seems wildly 
inappropriate. Yet, it was the majority’s certainty about its ability to 
determine the validity of a contract to perform a religious act that 
weighed in the balance against Mr. Marcovitz’s religious freedom claim.  
At all events, however, what the majority in Bruker does not explain 
is why the public interest in the certainty of contract in Bruker was more 
significant than that in Amselem. Recall that the majority in Amselem 
largely ignored the public policy concerns about certainty of contract, 
limiting its enquiry to balancing the corresponding benefits and burdens 
that would be imposed on Amselem or the condominium. In Bruker, 
however, Abella J. effectively adopted Bastarache J.’s dissent in Amselem 
in which he asserted that the citizens of Quebec “have the right to expect 
that contracts will be respected”.232 This use of public policy 
demonstrates the instrumentalist approach to balancing: In Amselem, 
certainty of contract is not at all weighed by the majority, whilst in 
Bruker it forms an important part of the majority’s reasons for overriding 
the defendant’s religious freedom claim. This contradiction shows that 
what judges decide to put on the scale often drives the outcome. 
In truth, however, the primary factor explaining the difference 
between Amselem and Bruker seems to be that Bruker is about equality. 
As noted above, although the public policy in ensuring that contracts are 
performed was one factor taken into consideration, it seems that Abella J. 
would still have denied the religion claim based on the “public interest in 
protecting equality rights [and] the dignity of Jewish women in their 
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independent ability to divorce and remarry”. 233 Enforcing the promise to 
get a religious divorce was not, therefore, merely a matter of contract, 
but was motivated by the Court’s desire to remove religious barriers to 
marriage.234 Bruker is about putting marriage in one religious community 
on an equal footing. Indeed, as Abella J. put it in a rather unusual 
statement, it is about ensuring “that members of the Canadian public are 
not arbitrarily disadvantaged by their religion”.235 
The willingness to interpret religious doctrine in order to advance 
equality is one means by which courts place equality at the top of the 
hierarchy. Without doubt, one of the most troubling examples of this 
phenomenon is found in Hall (Litigation guardian of) v. Powers,236 
wherein the Ontario Superior Court granted an injunction against a 
Catholic school requiring it to permit a male student to attend the school 
prom with his same-sex partner. Here, the court made a distinction 
between activities going to the core of the school’s religious mission and 
those which had a “social or celebratory” function. The prom clearly fell 
into the latter category and thus a refusal to permit the student to attend 
with his chosen guest violated his equality rights. The court noted that 
the school existed to provide education “in a manner consistent with the 
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church”, but then proceeded to 
determine for itself what functions were and what were not integral to the 
Catholic educational mission.237 It justified its intervention on the 
grounds that there appears to be “a substantial diversity of opinion within 
the Catholic community regarding the appropriate pastoral care and the 
practical application of [the] Church’s teachings on homosexuality”.238 
Yet, putting aside the question of what all Catholics might believe on the 
subject, it was clear that this particular Catholic school believed that 
allowing a same-sex couple to attend a school dance would be contrary 
to the church’s teaching. The end result, therefore, was a judicial order 
requiring a religious institution to violate its own sincerely held religious 
beliefs on the basis that not every single member of the faith held the 
same position. 
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On the face of it, Hall violates the basic principle of Amselem,239 
which held that “freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake 
practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an 
individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely 
undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or 
her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is 
required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position 
of religious officials”.240 
To be sure, Hall was decided two years before Amselem, but earlier 
Supreme Court precedent had already made clear that “it is not the role 
of [the courts] to decide what any particular religion believes”.241 As a 
result, the fact that the court in Hall took it upon itself to determine the 
significance of a particular ethical belief was thus inappropriate. 
Nonetheless, the court ploughed ahead, and ultimately concluded that the 
objections to allowing same-sex couples at school events were not all 
that important to Catholics in general and so should not be of concern to 
this particular religious claimant. Bear in mind the Supreme Court’s 
assertion in Amselem that not all members of a religious group must 
subscribe to a particular tenet in order for that belief to be entitled to 
protection. What is important, at least according to Amselem, is that the 
particular claimant sincerely hold to the belief in question. Hall explicitly 
contradicts that principle, holding that, because not every Catholic is in 
agreement on how to apply the Church’s teachings on homosexuality, the 
school’s sincerely held belief is unworthy of protection. 
The tactic adopted in Hall forms the basis of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of Trinity Western University’s claims against the law 
societies. Here, the Court effectively “read down” TWU’s religious 
objection to conclude that, because the Community Covenant was not an 
integral part of the Christian faith, it could not form the basis of a claim 
of religious right. The British Columbia Law Society’s decision not to 
accredit TWU “did not limit religious freedom to a significant extent”, 
because the mandatory covenant at issue was “not absolutely required for 
the religious practice at issue: namely, to study law in a Christian 
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learning environment”.242 The Court eliminated the religious element of 
TWU’s claim simply by determining that the covenant was a means to 
create an “optimal” learning environment for those involved, rather than 
a required element of a Christian law school.243 In support of this 
position, the majority insisted that denying prospective students the 
ability to attend a school with a mandatory Community Covenant did not 
rise to the level of “forced apostasy” and, therefore, there was no injury 
to a cognizable religious interest.244  
It is important to note, however, that the evidence for the majority’s 
assertion came from affidavits submitted by prospective students, not 
from the university itself. The Court, in other words, was judging the 
sincerity of TWU’s belief on what other people might have said about 
it.245 Thus, the TWU Court (as did the courts in Bruker and Hall) ignored 
Amselem’s admonition that the sincerity of a claimant’s belief is not 
measured by what his co-religionists might think or do: 
Since the focus of the inquiry is not on what others view the claimant’s 
religious obligations as being, but rather what the claimant views these 
personal religious “obligations” to be, it is inappropriate to require 
expert opinions to show sincerity of belief. An “expert” or an authority 
on religious law is not the surrogate for an individual’s affirmation of 
what his or her religious beliefs are. Religious belief is intensely 
personal and can easily vary from one individual to another. Requiring 
proof of the established practices of a religion to gauge the sincerity of 
belief diminishes the very freedom we seek to protect.246 
The focus in TWU, therefore, should not have been what prospective 
students might understand as being important to TWU’s mission, but 
rather on what TWU itself understood its mission and religious principles 
required. The question after Amselem should then have been whether 
TWU’s belief in the importance of the Community Covenant was 
sincerely held.247 The majority seems to have completely ignored that 
principle. In sum, it should not have mattered if TWU was the only 
institution in the entire world that thought a Community Covenant was 
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required for a Christian university. Under Amselem, that belief, if 
sincerely held, was entitled to respect and deference for purposes of the 
Charter analysis. 
This refusal to engage with TWU’s own vision of its religious 
principles then allowed the majority to conclude that there was no 
significant interference with TWU’s religious freedom. In the Court’s 
view, the denial of approval was not a “serious limitation” on the rights 
of the TWU community because “no evangelical Christian is denied the 
right to practise his or her religion as and where they choose”.248 Again, 
this misses the mark by a mile: The primary claim at issue was not 
brought by evangelical Christians in general. It was brought by Trinity 
Western University, which made a specific claim about what it believed 
its religious faith required.249 The Court ignored that claim. This allowed 
the majority to balance what it characterized as a trivial impairment on a 
non-essential religious preference against the weightier equality rights of 
LGBTQ people. 
TWU is, therefore, the most recent example of the Supreme Court 
using the definitional and balancing process to manipulate outcomes in 
cases where rights collide. By defining TWU’s Community Covenant as 
non-essential to its faith or mission, the Court was able to largely 
eliminate any conflict between the religious freedom and equality claims. 
In the end, it was able to balance an optional religious “preference” 
against a significant equality interest. The definitional aspect of the case 
was, thus, paramount. Had the TWU Court taken TWU’s claims 
seriously, then the balancing test might have produced a different result.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, 
Canadian courts have developed a hierarchy of rights. This hierarchy 
places equality at the top of the pyramid, with other rights falling lower 
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on the scale. This allocation of priority has been achieved through a 
process of definition and balancing where rights collide. The extent to 
which a court defines the contours of a right narrowly or broadly may, in 
many cases, be determinative of the outcome. A narrow definition might 
make a conflict disappear, whilst a broader one requires that the claim be 
balanced against another competing right. Moreover, in balancing rights, 
courts are relatively free to include whatever factors seems most 
appropriate to them. The result is that, on its face at least, the definition 
and balancing process is highly idiosyncratic and unpredictable. In 
reality, however, the case law indicates that, in many instances, courts 
have used the process to achieve particular aims, one of which is to 
establish the current hierarchy. 
 
 
